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CORPORATIONS AND THE MARKET
FOR LAW
Larry E. Ribstein*
Erin Ann O’Hara**
The state competition for corporate law has long been studied as
a distinct phenomenon. Under the traditional view, corporations are
subject to a unique choice-of-law rule, the “internal affairs doctrine”
(IAD). This rule is explained as a historical accident, or by the special logistics of the corporate contract. The resulting market for corporate law appears to have special characteristics, particularly including the dominance of the single state of Delaware. This article
challenges the traditional view. It shows that the corporate law market is best understood as a special application of the general market
for law. Parties to many types of contractual relationships are able to
choose the law they wish to govern their relationship, and states compete to provide the law that the parties most desire. Any differences
between the corporate and general law markets are matters of degree
rather than kind and are explained by applying the general forces underlying the law market to particular sets of circumstances. Theories
of corporate competition that ignore the broader law market context
are incomplete, and the competition for corporate law carries lessons
for the law market generally. Moreover, the connection between the
corporate and other law markets has implications for the constitutional status of the IAD, the scope of the IAD, and for the relationship between state and federal law.
In 1974 William Cary popularized the notion that there was a market for corporate law. In that market, corporations could choose among
states as places of incorporation, and Delaware became the dominant
competitor in the provision of corporate laws.1 Cary also asserted that
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1. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE
L.J. 663 (1974).
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because managers choose the place of incorporation, state corporate law,
especially Delaware law, gives managers too much power and prerogative within their firms.2 Cary’s characterization of this market as a “race
to the bottom” is controversial, and the debate it sparked has important
implications for the regulation of corporate governance. Numerous
scholars have joined Cary in examining the nature of the market for corporate law and the extent to which Delaware dominates this market.3
While examining the corporate law market, scholars have largely
ignored the fact that this market for law coexists with markets for many
other types of law. The corporate law market seems unique because its
source is found in a special rule, the “internal affairs doctrine” (IAD),
which holds that the law of the state of incorporation governs the relationship between the managers, the shareholders, and the corporation.4
Corporations can choose their place of incorporation without having any
other connection with the state of incorporation. This contrasts with the
rule applicable to other contracts, as summarized in the Restatement
(Second) of Conflicts, which conditions enforcement of contractual
choice-of-law clauses on the parties’ connection to the state whose law is
chosen.5 The contrast between the rules is apparent in Judge Posner’s
opinion in Curtis 1000 Inc. v. Suess,6 which rejected the choice of Delaware law, the employer’s state of incorporation, as applied to the noncompetition clause in an employee’s contract with his firm.7 The firm
was not entitled to rely on Delaware law because Delaware lacked a sufficient connection to the contract, even though, as Posner pointed out,
the choice of Delaware law would have been perfectly acceptable for the
corporation’s internal affairs despite the shareholders’ lack of connection
to Delaware.8
Because of the IAD, states can compete to supply corporate law
separate from tax law, regulatory law, or other benefits. To obtain tax
and other benefits in a particular state, a corporation might need to locate a plant or other assets in that particular state. By incorporating in a
different state, the corporation can choose among the particular beneficial aspects of each state’s laws. Without the IAD, the corporation
would be forced to choose a single state’s bundle of laws, including corporate, tax, and regulatory law.
Commentators have given at least two explanations for this apparently special treatment of corporations under the IAD. First, in their
2. Id. at 697–99.
3. See discussion infra Part III.B.
4. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 304, 307 (1971). Other rules recognize the application of the law of the state of incorporation concerning particular matters. See id. § 296
(requirements for incorporation); id. § 297 (states’ recognition of foreign incorporations); id. § 303
(determination of who is shareholder); id. § 306 (liability of majority shareholder).
5. See id. § 187(2).
6. 24 F.3d 941 (7th Cir. 1994).
7. Id. at 948–49.
8. Id.
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early history in the United States, corporations had to be created by special act of the state legislature, which provided for special state privileges
and concessions.9 Because corporations were “creatures” of the state
that created them,10 the IAD had strong legal traction. Indeed, the question of which law to apply to the governance of a corporation never arose
as it did for other contracts.11
Second, there seems to be compelling practical reasons for ensuring
that only one lawmaking body can determine a firm’s governance and financial rights.12 If, for example, California required one method of voting for directors while New York required another for the directors of
the same company, the operations of the firm would be hampered.
Given its distinct origins and justification, it is not surprising that
the corporate law market appears different from the markets for other
types of law. This market seems to be dominated by a single supplier,
Delaware. This market structure seems attributable not only to the IAD,
but also to the sizable franchise fee Delaware is able to collect for the
privilege of using its law. Numerous scholars have examined this phenomenon and its implications for the efficiency of corporate law.13
The apparent distinctiveness of the corporate law market and the
IAD has legal implications. First, the contrast between the IAD and the
general rule on enforcing contractual choice of law suggests that the corporation is something other than a mere contract. Incorporating states
therefore seem to have special regulatory powers over corporations to
balance the special privilege the IAD confers. Second, the special treatment of corporations suggests that the IAD has constitutional status. To
the extent that the rule stems from special state involvement in corporations, a state court’s application of the law of a nonincorporating state
seems a serious breach of the comity that states owe each others’ laws. A
state’s intricate involvement in “its” firms seems to demand the application of only that state’s law to its firms even when transacting business in
a national economy, and to privilege state rather than federal regulation
of the internal affairs of the firms.
On closer examination, however, the uniqueness of the corporate
law market starts to fade. A corporation is basically a set of contracts
among and between many parties, including creditors, shareholders, employees, and directors.14 These contract rules specify (1) the rights of
9. See Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, 32 J. CORP.
L. 33, 44–45 (2006).
10. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Constitutional Conception of the Corporation, 4 SUP. CT. ECON.
REV. 95, 98 (1995).
11. Id. at 99.
12. See, e.g., EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 23.4 (2d ed. 1992) (expressing view that IAD is “practically a necessary rule” in order to promote uniformity of shareholders’ rights and duties).
13. See infra Part IV.A.
14. For a discussion of the arguments for and against the contractual theory of the corporation,
see Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-
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some of these parties to share the contract’s benefits and burdens (i.e.,
profits and losses), (2) the allocation of power to make decisions that
bind members of the corporation, and (3) the processes by which these
decisions are made. One might question, therefore, whether corporations should get a different choice-of-law rule from that applied to other
contracts. After all, firms that sell insurance, franchises, or anything on
the Internet somehow cope with imperfectly enforced choice-of-law
clauses despite similar difficulties customizing contracts for buyers in different states.
To be sure, public corporations present unique problems. It is impossible to give thousands of shareholders different financial and voting
rights according to where they reside. The market could not possibly
price shares under these conditions. But these problems imply only that
one rule needs to apply to a corporation’s governance, which could be
the law of the corporation’s base of operations and not necessarily the
law chosen by the firm.15 A base-of-operations rule might lead to a different sort of market for corporate law, but it would not necessarily be
unworkable.
The claim that the IAD derives from the special nature of the corporation must rest on the IAD’s basis in the state-creation theory of the
corporation.16 In other words, once having characterized corporations as
creatures of state law, the choice-of-law rule the courts applied to corporations naturally followed. From this standpoint, the IAD has little to do
with the rest of the choice-of-law universe.
There are several problems with this historically based “corporate
exceptionalism” approach. First, corporations long ago broke from their
origins as concessions or franchises and became more like ordinary contracts.17 Thus, in order to adhere to the IAD, courts had to ignore the
widening gap between theory and reality.
Second, even if courts were reluctant to abandon this legal theory,
legislatures were free to make the policy judgment that it was more important to protect their regulatory prerogatives than to adhere to an ancient concept of the corporation. Thus, once corporate operations began
to expand beyond the state of incorporation, legislatures in the states in
which they transacted business could have decreed that local corporate
law would apply to disputes that involved their citizens.
Third, something like the IAD has been applied far beyond the corporate sphere. It applies to partnerships and other business associations

Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 7–18 (1990). For an application of the contractual theory of the
corporation to choice of law, see Larry E. Ribstein, Choosing Law By Contract, 18 J. CORP. L. 245
(1993).
15. In Europe, for example, most countries apply the law of the seat of the corporation. See infra Part IV.D.
16. See supra text accompanying notes 9–10.
17. See infra Part II.A.
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that traditionally have not been regarded as state creations.18 If the IAD
can be applied to what is essentially a contract among individual members or partners of an unincorporated business association, why not to
the contracts forming other long-term business relationships such as
franchises? Principles similar to the IAD have been applied to many
types of conventional commercial contracts.19 Although the general rule
for contractual choice of law contemplates significant limits on party
choice, in practice choice-of-law clauses in conventional contracts are
very generally enforced. Moreover, something like the IAD has been
applied to trusts,20 and, more recently, to European corporations, which
have been governed by the “real seat” choice-of-law rule.21
In general, we show that the market for corporate law is best understood as part of a general market for laws that exists for many different
types of contracts. Our main contribution is to argue that similar political forces and economic incentives underlie all of these markets. Any
differences among these markets and in the rules governing them can be
explained by the differing specific market forces and the relative balance
of power of competing political groups affected by the market forces.
Both for corporations and for other contracts, the market is driven by
parties’ ability to move among jurisdictions and those jurisdictions’ incentives to compete for people, firms, and litigation. This broader perspective on law markets enables us to better understand both the market
for corporate law and the market for other law. Moreover, this new perspective enables a richer understanding of the processes underlying jurisdictional competition and its role in disciplining states’ and nations’
creation of law. The focus on the market for corporate law has simply
revealed one manifestation of deeper phenomena.
Placing the market for corporate law in its broader context also has
significant implications for the legal treatment of corporate and contract
law issues. First, the non-uniqueness of the corporate law market undermines arguments that the IAD should be subject to constitutional
protection, because the new analysis shows how both the corporate and
the general law market have managed to thrive without such protection.
Moreover, if the IAD is, indeed, fundamentally just another contractual
choice-of-law rule, any constitutional protection of the IAD would have
to distinguish rules for other contracts. In other words, if the Supreme
Court is prepared to hold that it is unconstitutional for California to
regulate the contract governing the thousands of shareholders of a Delaware corporation, it must be prepared to explain why California law
should be able to regulate the contract governing the thousands of Cali-

18.
19.
20.
21.

See infra Part IV.B–C.
See infra Part IV.F.
See infra Part IV.G.
See infra Part IV.D.
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fornia employees who are working under a Delaware employment contract.
Second, this article’s analysis helps to settle current controversies
regarding the appropriate scope of state and federal corporate law and
the states’ application of the IAD. May the federal government regulate
corporate governance just as it does securities trading? May California
regulate insider trading in a Delaware corporation on behalf of California shareholders? If the corporate law market and the IAD are fundamentally related to the general law market and rules governing choiceof-law clauses for other contracts, then the answer to both questions is
yes. If the IAD is not treated as a unique privilege conferred by the
states on their corporate creations, then incorporating states no longer
can claim special powers to exclusively regulate corporate contracts
above and beyond their powers to regulate other contracts.
Just as contractual choice of law does not oust state and federal
regulatory powers in the general law market, neither does it do so in the
corporate law market. At the same time, this article’s analysis provides a
basis for determining how far state and federal regulation should go.
The functioning of the law market suggests appropriate constraints on
state refusal to enforce contractual choice of law. It also shows why the
federal government ought generally defer to state law as long as the
states are able to coordinate their regulation through the law market.
The article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the “demand” side
of both the market for law generally and the market for corporate law.
The demand side of the market involves parties’ desire to choose their
governing law and its influence on their decisions regarding where to locate, invest, and litigate. Those choices influence the extent to which
states are willing to enable parties to contract for their governing law.
The same mechanisms that explain enforcement of other contractual
choices also explain the origins of the IAD and the rules governing the
corporate law market. Broad enforcement of the IAD resulted from corporations’ mobility and interest groups’ incentives both to provide corporate law and to refrain from driving commerce to other jurisdictions.
Part II discusses the “supply” side of the law market. It shows how
jurisdictions (or more precisely their politicians) compete for residents,
investment, and litigation. Some states are actively competing for law
business, and in those states the competition is driven most importantly
by lawyers. Other states, while not competing for business, nevertheless
have responded to party mobility by enforcing contractual choice-of-law,
choice-of-forum, and arbitration clauses in an effort to retain residents,
jobs, investments, and tax revenues. These market forces have caused
the law to move toward very general enforcement of contractual choice
of law, at least in commercial cases. Similar forces are at work for corporations. Here, too, lawyers have played a key role in promoting active
competition, particularly in Delaware.
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Part III discusses the specific limitations on the general and corporate law markets that persist due to weaknesses in the forces of demand
and supply. In the general law market, courts often require a connection
between the parties and the contractually designated state, and even then
a court can refuse to apply the law chosen by the parties if that law would
interfere with the fundamental public policy of another state. Where
these limitations are imposed, pro-regulatory interest groups have successfully resisted the competitive pressures of the law market. However,
in order to facilitate interstate trade, the federal government can always
preempt these states’ refusals to enforce choice-of-law clauses. The rules
for corporations seem on the surface to be quite different because they
lack both the “connection” requirement and the public policy exception.
On closer examination, however, law market forces have produced similar rules for corporate and for other commercial contracts. Courts in
several states have relaxed the connection requirement for commercial
noncorporate contracts. Conversely, corporations are subject to state
public policies, though these policies tend to be located formally outside
the IAD. Finally, the costly multiplicity of state corporate law has been a
significant factor in the development of several federal laws.
Part IV further undercuts the notion of a distinct corporate law
market by showing that there are both variations within the corporate
law market and links between the market for corporate law and the market for other types of contracts. This analysis demonstrates how little the
IAD in fact explains about the corporate law market and how much,
rather, is explained by the operation of supply and demand forces.
Part V, then, develops the general implications of this article’s
analysis for constitutional law, the limits on state and federal regulation,
and for future scholarship.
I.

THE DEMAND SIDE OF THE LAW MARKET

This Part begins to situate the corporate law market within the
forces that drive the general market for law. We discuss the demand for
contractual choice of law that drives both markets. Our focus here is on
how the forces of jurisdictional competition promote widespread enforcement of contractual choice of law. In other words, we focus on how
contracting for law arises, rather than on the competition that contractual
choice generates. We discuss the latter issue in our later discussion of the
structure of the corporate law market.22
In general, we show that the law market exists because parties to
most relationships that involve contracts have a strong incentive to contract for their governing law. Firms and individuals want both to clarify

22.

See infra Part IV.
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the legal rules that will apply to their contract and to select laws that enhance the likelihood that their agreement will be enforced as they intend.
The important question is why courts, with at least the tacit permission of legislators, would enforce these contracts at the expense of their
own state’s regulation even when that regulation is supported by strong
interest groups in the state. Part of the answer is that contracting parties
can be viewed as “shopping” for, or demanding, the regulation and adjudication of particular states. Contracting parties can impose two types of
costs on states that attempt to impose regulation that cannot be avoided
through party choice. First, the parties can decide to make investments
in states that favor their preferred contracts and to avoid states that disfavor them. Second, the parties can avoid or choose to litigate in courts
depending on the courts’ willingness to respect their preferences for a
particular state’s law. Generally, the demand side of the law market focuses on parties’ desire to have their choice-of-law clauses enforced. In
the market for corporate law, the demand side is driven by the firm’s
choice of the place of incorporation.
A.

The General Law Market

This subpart introduces the demand side forces in the law market
generally, while subpart B considers demand side forces specific to the
market for corporate law. The demand side of the law market entails
two inquiries. First, why do parties contract for law? As discussed in
subsection 1, the parties attempt to choose their governing law in order
to enhance predictability and fit, and to attempt to eliminate multiple potentially inconsistent legal mandates. Second, subsection 2 discusses why
each state as a political entity has incentives to enforce party choice of
law even when enforcement of these choices enables the parties to evade
that state’s laws. State cooperation depends on the parties’ options when
confronted by a court or legislature that refuses to enforce the contract.
1.

Why Do Parties Contract for Law?

Parties contract for law to ensure that their disputes will be resolved
according to the law that best fits their relationship. Because the parties’
contract embodies the basic terms of their relationship, the quest for fit
implies that the parties want a law that enforces their contract. Without
a choice-of-law clause, the parties to interstate contracts cannot confidently predict what law a court ultimately will apply to their dispute.
According to the dominant rule on choice of law for contracts in the
United States, courts will apply the law of the state with “the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties.”23 When two parties contract exclusively with one another, it can be difficult for them to
23.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(1) (1971).
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determine at the time of contracting which state has the most significant
relationship. Uncertainty creates even more difficulty when a firm contracts with many suppliers, creditors, employees, and/or customers, because a different governing law could end up applying to each contract.
Contracting for law enables the parties to know what law will apply
not only at trial, but also when contracting. Obviously the parties need
to know when contracting not only whether and to what extent a court
will enforce their contract, but also what default rules it will apply, and
whether the contract language will be interpreted rigidly or flexibly. For
example, New York courts tend to adhere fairly closely to the language
of the contract, while California courts are known for their greater flexibility.24 Contracting for law is also critical when a firm enters into the
same basic relationship with multiple people or firms. A contract that
selects a particular state’s law enables the firm to adopt a single firmwide
policy for its performance that applies to all similar dealings.
Thus, by making an enforceable choice of law, parties can obtain a
better fit and greater certainty and predictability, and they are better
able to streamline their operating policies than is otherwise possible under default choice-of-law rules. These benefits give the parties the incentive to choose their governing law wherever possible. This is reflected in
the fact that choice-of-law clauses are routinely included in most commercial contracts today.25
2.

Party Mobility

While contracting for law has obvious benefits for the parties, it
presents a problem for state lawmakers. Because state regulation of contracts can be negated if parties can opt out of that regulation by choosing
alternative governing laws, courts and legislatures in regulating states
have obvious incentives not to enforce those choices. How can parties
overcome these difficulties? The answer begins with the alternatives
available to contracting parties when confronted by courts or legislatures
that refuse to enforce their choices (referred to here as “nonenforcing”
states).
One alternative parties have to ensure enforcement of their choices
is to prevent nonenforcing courts from exercising personal jurisdiction
over them. Without personal jurisdiction, the nonenforcing state lacks
power to compel that party to enter its courts. Personal jurisdiction is
limited in the United States by the Due Process Clauses in the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.26 Due Process pre24. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Market for Contracts 35 (Law & Econ.
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 06-45, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=938557.
25. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Merger Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1975, 1978 (2006); Larry E. Ribstein, From Efficiency to Politics in Contractual Choice of Law, 37 GA. L. REV. 363, 400, 403 (2003).
26. See U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV.
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vents states from asserting jurisdiction over parties who lack “minimum
contacts” with the state.27 Minimum contacts involve directing action
toward the forum in a way that makes it fair to require the person to defend a lawsuit involving the action in that state.28 In addition, a court
may assert “general” jurisdiction over a defendant that has extensive local contacts, such as maintaining a principal place of business, even if the
contacts did not arise out of or relate to the particular transaction at issue.29 By limiting the contacts with a state to those that are nonextensive,
a firm can deprive a state’s courts of the ability to exercise general jurisdiction over it. By avoiding the state altogether, a firm can defeat that
state’s ability to exercise even more limited specific jurisdiction over the
firm.
The ability of firms to manipulate contacts with states is important
not just for personal jurisdiction, but also to control the outcome of a
choice-of-law analysis. Prior to the 1930s, choice-of-law rules in the U.S.
were based mainly on a “vested rights” approach, under which states acquired law-making jurisdiction if acts relevant to the cause of action occurred within the state.30 Under this approach, the important event for
contracts was the contract formation, although there was authority for
applying the place of formation designated in the contract itself, particularly if the contract spanned several states.31 In the 1960s, an alternative
choice-of-law approach evolved under the influence of Brainerd Currie
to one based on state “interests.”32 Under Currie’s approach, legislatures
were presumed to have an “interest” in applying local laws only to benefit local residents.33 If multiple states had an interest in applying their
laws, the forum—which could be anywhere the plaintiff could get personal jurisdiction over the defendant—applied its law.34 About half of
the states now apply a third method, the Second Restatement’s most significant relationship test, to determine the governing law for contracts
disputes.35 Courts making that determination look to a variety of contacts, including the places of contracting, negotiation, subject matter of
the contract, performance, and the location of the parties,36 as well as to
27. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
28. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 111–12 (1987).
29. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414–15 (1984). For a general discussion of the constraints on personal jurisdiction in the U.S. and Europe, see RUSSELL J.
WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 4.9C (4th ed. 2001).
30. See JAMES A. MARTIN, CONFLICT OF LAWS 16–17 (2d ed. 1985).
31. See Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1151 (2000).
32. See generally BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963).
33. See, e.g., id. at 201–02 (discussing California’s interest in protecting community from cost of
injured employee).
34. See Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277, 1315–17 (1989)
(describing Currie’s approach).
35. EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 18.21, at 1002–03 n.14 (4th ed. 2004).
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(2) (1971).
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seven general principles that guide all choice-of-law questions.37 For
most modern approaches, the likelihood of a law applying to a dispute
tends to rise as a party’s connection with a state grows.
Firms’ contacts with states also matter because most states follow
the Second Restatement rules conditioning enforcement of contractual
choice of law on parties’ connections with the designated state. The Second Restatement drafters recognized that an indeterminate approach to
choice of law threatened to undermine the predictability that parties
value in forming contracts. Accordingly, they included a provision designed to maximize the extent to which parties are able to choose their
own law to govern their relationships. Regarding default rules, or rules
of contract interpretation, parties can pick any law they wish.38 This reflects the parties’ ability to include these rules directly in their contracts.
The Second Restatement also provides for some enforcement of the parties’ choice even if enforcing the choice has the effect of enabling the parties to circumvent a mandatory rule. The Second Restatement directs
courts to bar enforcement as to mandatory rules where the contract designates a state that “has no substantial relationship to the parties or the
transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties’
choice,” or where the chosen state has a “substantial relationship” with
the parties or contract but the chosen law is “contrary to a fundamental
policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen
state in the determination of the particular issue” and that state would be
selected under general choice-of-law principles.39
The current version of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC or the
Code) also gives parties significant latitude to contract for their own governing law. In business-to-business transactions the UCC provides that
the parties can effectively contract for the application of a state’s law
even if the law does not satisfy the reasonable relationship requirement.40
The contractual choice is not effective if it would force courts to apply
law that would be contrary to a fundamental policy of the “default” jurisdiction—i.e., the state or country whose connection with the parties or
transaction would justify applying its law in the absence of agreement.41
By contrast, in transactions involving a consumer, the Code requires that
the parties have a reasonable relationship with the designated state, and
it stipulates that choice-of-law clauses may not deprive the consumer of
the protection of a law in which the consumer principally resides or other
jurisdiction where the contract is made or the goods delivered.42 The
pre-amended version of the Code still in force in most states requires

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. § 6.
Id. § 187(1).
Id. § 187(2).
U.C.C. § 1-301(c)(1) (2004).
Id.
Id. § 1-301(e)(2).
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only that the parties to all UCC contracts have a reasonable relationship
with the designated state.43
In sum, both the governing law under general choice-of-law rules
and the enforcement of choice-of-law clauses typically depend on the
parties’ contacts with both the state whose law is chosen and the states
whose laws they want to avoid. The parties’ ability to use a choice-of-law
clause to avoid a state’s mandatory rule therefore depends not only on
avoiding connections with the undesirable state, which may be difficult
or impossible for a national firm, but also on establishing enough of a
connection with a desirable state that that state’s interest might be
deemed to outweigh the interest of the undesirable state. This gives contracting parties—particularly interstate or global firms that rely extensively on choice-of-law clauses—incentives to establish close connections
with, or perhaps base operations in, states that enforce the parties’ contracts, including choice-of-law clauses.
Party mobility in response to regulation is becoming more important as the costs of mobility decline. With the rise of computers, the
Internet, express delivery service, and other technological innovations,
modern business relies less on bricks-and-mortar buildings and more on
geographically independent or mobile assets such as intellectual property
and human capital. Shrinking trade barriers let firms find trade and investment opportunities anywhere in the world. This means firms may be
increasingly willing and able both to avoid jurisdictions that impose
tough restrictions and to move to states that can offer desirable packages
of legal rules, including a general policy of enforcing contracts. A state
can compete to attract these firms in one of two ways. First, it can attempt to provide an appealing bundle of laws to enhance the range of
firms’ activities. Second, a state can attract mobile assets by providing an
important subset of the laws firms desire, such as corporate law, while
enabling those firms to freely contract for other states’ laws when local
laws prove unsuitable.
Finally, it might seem that, despite firms’ increasing mobility, their
location decisions would be driven primarily by factors other than enforceability of choice-of-law contracts, such as tax burdens and infrastructure. However, the impact of location on enforcement of choice of
law may sometimes be a significant marginal consideration. For example, there is data indicating that franchisors have made location decisions
based on the enforceability of choice-of-law and related clauses in franchise contracts.44 Nevertheless, the extent of firm mobility, and therefore
of its costs or benefits to states, depends partly on what benefits a state
can offer firms to offset the costs of bad laws. The more desirable a location is because of its non-law attributes such as its labor pool, its exten43. Id. § 1-105 (1954).
44. See Jonathan Klick et al., The Effect of Contract Regulation: The Case of Franchises 6 (Dec.
13, 2006) (unpublished research paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=951464.
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sive consumer market, or its plentiful natural resources, the more it can
get away with imposing costs on firms through harsh regulations promoted by local interest groups. We would therefore expect large, rich
states like California to be less responsive to the law market than small
states like Delaware.
3.

Controlling the Forum

Contracting parties can increase the probability that a choice-of-law
clause will be enforced by choosing to have their disputes resolved in a
forum that lacks a political incentive to block exit from state mandatory
rules. Parties have three ways of controlling the forum. First, the parties
can choose the court or other dispute resolution forum at the time of litigation. The plaintiff obviously has some control over where to file a lawsuit. Even a potential defendant often can control the forum for litigation by filing a declaratory judgment action. Moreover, a defendant may
be able to remove plaintiff’s case to a federal court where there is the
requisite diversity of citizenship.45 This removal power is significant because federal courts have less incentive than state courts to block exit
from mandatory rules imposed by the state legislature. Although in a diversity jurisdiction case the federal court must apply the local state
choice-of-law rule,46 these rules give judges significant discretion to enforce choice-of-law clauses.47
Second, the parties can include a court-selection clause in their contract. State courts obviously have a stronger incentive to apply local law
than they do the law of another state. Accordingly, the parties can enhance the likelihood that the court will enforce the choice-of-law clause if
they agree that the case will be tried in the state whose law the contract
selects.48 State courts do fairly routinely enforce choice-of-court clauses,
at least in commercial cases.49 One might wonder why courts would be
likelier to enforce choice-of-court clauses than choice-of-law clauses if
enforcing the former is tantamount to enforcing the latter. A possible
explanation is that a choice-of-court clause enables the court to enforce
the parties’ contract while at the same time refraining from making an
explicit policy choice between local law and the law designated in the
contract.
Third, the parties can include an arbitration clause. Private arbitrators owe nothing to the state legislature, and must keep the parties satisfied in order to reap future arbitration business. On balance, therefore,
45. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000).
46. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
47. See infra Part III.
48. O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 31, at 1158.
49. See Leandra Lederman, Viva Zapata!: Toward a Rational System of Forum-Selection Clause
Enforcement in Diversity Cases, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 422 (1991); Michael E. Solimine, The Quiet Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1998).
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they can be counted on to be more committed to enforcing contracts
than to preventing evasion of mandatory rules. The Federal Arbitration
Act mandates that an arbitration clause in a contract that is valid under
state law must be enforced not only by federal courts, but also by state
courts when they decide cases that involve federal questions or interstate
commerce.50 Because arbitration clauses can be used effectively to diminish the authority of nonenforcing courts,51 they reduce the stakes involved in choice-of-court and choice-of-law clauses. This may encourage
courts to enforce these provisions as well.
B.

The Corporate Law Market and the IAD

Viewed in its historical context, the IAD seems to have sprung fullblown from the corporation’s origin as a creature of state law. This historical explanation appears, in turn, to explain why the states so readily
recognized that the chartering state’s law controls the legal rights and obligations of the parties to the corporation. However, the history of corporate law fails to explain why courts and legislatures were willing to
recognize corporations formed in other states, or why once they did recognize those corporations they were willing to apply those states’ governance laws. In other words, the state-creation origins of corporate law,
instead of leading to broad acceptance of the IAD, could just as easily
have led to rules confining state-created corporations to the states of
their creation. Indeed, this alternative result would seem to have been
more likely since state legislators once controlled corporate rights and
privileges and derived benefits from this control. Lawmakers’ benefits
from the incorporation process would not be worth much if corporations
could buy charters from any state and do business in any other states,
since this would expose chartering states to ruinous price competition
over the provision of these charters. So, we have to explain why state
courts and legislators were willing to enforce a rule that broke down their
profitable territorial monopolies. The explanation lies in an understanding of the general market for law. Paralleling the discussion of the general law market, subsection 1 discusses corporations’ incentives to contract for the law relating to internal governance. Subsection 2 discusses
how corporate mobility contributed to the demand side of the market for
corporate law.52

50. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (2000).
51. See Stephen Ware, Default Rules From Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703 (1999) (arguing that the Federal Arbitration Act’s broad enforcement of
arbitration in effect permits evasion of mandatory rules).
52. Since the rules governing the corporate law market were established prior to the general enforcement of choice-of-forum and arbitration clauses in the United States, there is no corporate parallel to this aspect of the general law market. However, the strength of the market forces for corporate
law compared to the equivalent forces in the general law market explains why forum choice was unnecessary to facilitate the corporate law market.
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Why Do Parties Contract for Corporate Law?

Firms have precisely the same reasons to choose the law governing
the relations among the parties to the firm as all contracting parties have
to choose governing law: to ensure that their disputes will be resolved according to the law that best fits their relationship, to enable the parties to
know what law will apply at the time of contracting, and to allow the firm
to deal on the same basis with multiple parties.
One apparent difference between the two contexts is that the need
of corporations for the same law regarding multiple contracting parties is
obviously greater than it is for parties to most other contracts. For example, divvying up a common pool of resources and applying voting
rules would present a logistical nightmare for a national (not to mention
international) firm facing different restrictions in each state in which its
shareholders reside. Indeed, the need for a common rule is so compelling that it seems to distinguish corporate internal governance from other
types of contracts. However, viewing corporations in the context of the
general law market makes it obvious that corporations differ from most
contracting parties in this respect in degree rather than in kind. Moreover, corporations’ need for one rule does not mean that they need to be
able to designate that rule by contract. Finally, to the extent that corporations’ need for a single rule does distinguish corporate internal governance from other types of contracts, it follows that firms had a commensurately stronger incentive to avoid states that refused to enforce their
choice of state of incorporation.
2.

Party Mobility

The increasing mobility of the corporation in the latter part of the
nineteenth century was an important factor in developing the IAD. Indeed, the corporate law market might be said to be a product of the industrial revolution. Technological advances like the railroad and telegraph, mass advertising, and assembly line production gave rise to firms
whose production facilities and headquarters were distinct from their nationwide markets.53 This let firms operate outside their states of incorporation and therefore choose their incorporating state based on a state’s
law and legal environment rather than only on its resources and markets.
In addition, firms could avoid investing assets in states that were hostile
to foreign corporations, withholding valuable assets and jobs from them.
This would upset powerful business and labor interest groups within the
state, which could be expected to lobby against such hostile legislation.
At the same time, firms could continue to access state markets because

53.

See ALFRED CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND 203–06 (1977).
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the Commerce Clause prevented the states from discriminating against
or imposing unreasonable burdens on interstate trade.54
Until the 1890s, corporate mobility mainly promoted state competition for investments rather than for charters, since at that time corporations still had to incorporate in states with which they had significant contacts.55 States could lure corporate investments by offering an attractive
tax and regulatory environment, and by making it easier to get corporate
charters. A “general incorporation” option, by which any firm could
form a corporation without getting special permission from the state,
gradually replaced special chartering.56 At first, however, the states were
content to divide up the incorporation market and limit their competition
to one for corporate investments rather than for charters.57 In other
words, firms had to incorporate where they were based. In order to create today’s corporate law market, states had to be willing to incorporate
“tramp” firms that had no local connections.
The equilibrium shifted when changes in business practices and
technologies increased the benefits of prohibited practices and gave firms
incentives to avoid regulatory impediments. For example, firms needed
more flexibility in pricing their shares for sale in dynamic capital markets
than they had under rules developed before these markets were available.58 Until then, firms had a choice either to engage in costly lobbying
to remove local impediments or to move to states with laxer laws.
Clearly they would welcome being able to choose a state’s law without
physically moving there. The time was ripe for a state to become a first
mover to attract foreign firms to incorporate locally.
New Jersey became that first mover. It had earlier acquired a financial incentive to compete for charters when it extended its railroad
taxation scheme to tax non-railroad corporations on the basis of their
capital stock. The scheme was not based on the corporations’ presence
in the state.59 New Jersey, therefore, was able to increase revenues despite losing railroad tax revenues by “charter-mongering,” or using a
flexible corporation law to attract incorporations by out-of-state firms
which maintained no more than a virtual presence in New Jersey.60
The standard version of the New Jersey success story is that its key
innovation was to expressly permit holding companies.61 Under this
story, New Jersey acquired importance and national stature through the

54. See infra text accompanying note 244.
55. See Tung, supra note 9, at 62–64.
56. See Henry N. Butler, Nineteenth Century Jurisdictional Competition in the Granting of Corporate Privileges, 14 J. LEG. STUD. 129 (1985).
57. See id.
58. See infra text accompanying note 71.
59. See Christopher Grandy, New Jersey Corporate Charter-Mongering, 1875–1929, 49 J. ECON.
HIST. 677, 680–81 (1989).
60. Id.
61. Id.
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efforts of John D. Rockefeller to bring the first of the large integrated
enterprises that were emerging from the Industrial Revolution into a cohesive legal form.62 When the Ohio Supreme Court ruled in 1892 that
the trust agreement binding Standard Oil of Ohio was an illegal attempt
to monopolize the petroleum business, Rockefeller and his advisors already were studying the New Jersey innovation.63 After the Ohio decision, Standard Oil simply dissolved the trust and formed a New Jersey
holding company.64
An alternative explanation of New Jersey’s success offered by Lawrence Mitchell is that New Jersey included very favorable provisions
permitting the use of stock to buy property and, more importantly, substantially empowered the directors to set the valuation.65 Mitchell notes
that New Jersey offered other advantages, including protecting officers
and directors from actions brought in New Jersey under other states’
laws.66
Even after New Jersey opened Pandora’s Box and started competing for charters, there was still an important ingredient missing from the
corporate law market. Other states technically could have resisted by
continuing to apply their own restrictive laws to their corporations that
sought to combine with New Jersey corporations. The states could, for
example, adopt something like the European “real seat” rule discussed
below67 that would have applied local law to New Jersey tramp corporations headquartered in the state. Because it parallels the Second Restatement’s most significant relationship test, a “real seat” rule would result in the same choice-of-law treatment as other contracts. Why did the
states not take this step?68
The explanation for why other states became willing to respect a
corporation’s choice of internal governance law ultimately rests, at least
in part, on demand-side factors that link corporations with other contexts
for applying contractual choice of law. Corporations, like other firms,
could physically exit states that otherwise refuse to apply the law of the
incorporating state. More precisely, corporations could avoid contacts
62. See RON CHERNOW, TITAN: THE LIFE OF JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, SR. 332–33 (Random
House 1998).
63. Id.
64. See id.
65. See LAWRENCE MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY: HOW FINANCE TRIUMPHED
OVER INDUSTRY 48–54 (2007).
66. Id. at 54–55.
67. See infra Part IV.D.
68. In a draft paper, John Coates discusses some of the elements of this explanation of the IAD.
See John C. Coates IV, The Legal Origins of the (Unimportant) U.S. “Market” for Corporate Charters
(October 18, 2004) (on file with authors). Coates shows that host states legally could have prevented
the operation of the IAD. Coates explains their failure to do so mostly by the triviality of much of
corporate law, and by the fact that many of the significant issues have been separated from corporate
law and dealt with under non-“corporate” state and, most importantly, federal law. This discussion is
consistent with much of the story presented in this article, though unlike the present article, Coates
does not analyze the IAD in light of general market for law.
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with other states that would make it possible for their courts to apply
their law to the corporation. In other words, firms could strategically
choose where to sell their stock and where to locate their factories and
other corporate assets so as to avoid states that refused to recognize the
law of the incorporating state.69
One might be skeptical that in expanded interstate markets corporations had a realistic opportunity to avoid states that threatened to regulate their internal governance. Suppose, for example, states aggressively
attempted to regulate corporate governance on the basis of having just
enough contact to exercise personal jurisdiction.70 Corporations would
then be forced to go to great lengths to forgo conducting business with
customers, suppliers, or shareholders in the regulating state. Is it likely
corporations would incur these costs just to get the internal governance
rules they wanted? If not, what incentives would states have to forgo
regulating foreign firms’ internal governance?
At least two factors might explain why firms’ physical mobility was
enough to motivate states to respect the IAD. First, expanding corporations had a strong need for flexible rules. For example, in order to access
rapidly developing capital markets, firms needed relief from rules requiring newly issued securities to be sold at par.71 Thus, differences between
modern corporate rules and those based in early corporate history mattered enough to corporate development that firms might be willing to incur significant costs to avoid states with outmoded rules. Second, as discussed in subsection 1, firms had a strong practical need for assurance
that a single rule would apply to all of their members. To be sure, these
demand-side factors alone are not enough to explain why states responded to the threat of corporate exit by applying the law of the state of
incorporation. As with the general law market, this calls for a supplyside explanation, which we provide below in Part II.
Whatever the explanation for the acceptance of a market in corporate law, the market clearly exists today. This is demonstrated by the
denouement of the story of the corporate law market’s early history.
The corporation leader in the United States is now Delaware. What
happened to New Jersey? Interest groups and reformers protested that
New Jersey’s law facilitated monopolies.72 While one of these reformers,
Woodrow Wilson, was governor of New Jersey, the state in 1913
amended its corporation law to restrict holding companies and add strict
antitrust provisions.73 New Jersey’s next door neighbor then took over its
incorporation business just as New Jersey had taken Standard Oil from
69. See MITCHELL, supra note 65, at 30–56.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 27–29 (discussing constitutional limits on personal jurisdiction).
71. See MITCHELL, supra note 65 (discussing the importance of stock pricing rules to New Jersey’s early charter competition).
72. See Grandy, supra note 59, at 687.
73. Id. at 689.
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Ohio. In 1917, after Wilson moved on to higher office and New Jersey
saw what it had done to itself, the state tried to recapture its lost glory by
reversing its moves. But by then it was too late—Delaware was already
entrenched, corporations did not trust the New Jersey legislature,74 and
in any event Delaware gave them no reason to leave.
II. THE SUPPLY SIDE
This Part discusses how the supply side of both the law market generally and the market for corporate law can promote enforcement of contractual choice of law, and thereby foster the sort of jurisdictional competition that has generally been associated with the corporate law market.
The mandatory rules that parties seek to avoid with choice-of-law clauses
are often produced by powerful interest groups. However, exit and entry
by contracting parties create costs or benefits for other interest groups in
the state. These “exit-affected” interest groups can combine with the
groups that are directly burdened by the regulation to promote contractual choice of law even if the antiregulatory groups could not alone either
defeat the regulation or provide for enforcement of party choice. Subpart A discusses the supply side of the law market generally, while subpart B parallels this discussion with an analysis of the similar forces at
work in the corporate law market.75
A.

The General Law Market

As suppliers of law to the law market, each state typically occupies
one of two positions. Some states, which we will call “competing” states,
seek to have their laws selected by contracting parties. Other states,
which we will call “noncompeting” states, must then decide whether to
enforce these choices when their courts entertain suits involving those
contracts.
1.

Competing States

Some states have announced their intention to enforce choice-oflaw clauses. Specifically, California, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, New
York, and Texas each have statutes that provide for the automatic enforcement of choice-of-law clauses that designate the state’s law in high

74. Id.
75. We treat state judges and legislators as a single group of lawmakers, implicitly assuming that
their incentives are similar. In fact, both elected and appointed judges may have stronger incentives
than legislators not to enforce choice-of-law contracts. See Ribstein, supra note 25, at 448–49. The
justification for treating the two sets of lawmakers as a unit is that state judges ultimately are subject to
the interest group forces discussed below in this Part through the ballot or appointment process and
legislators’ ability to prescribe by statute the effect of choice-of-law statutes.
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value contracts.76 There is also data indicating that the law of these
states, and particularly New York and Delaware, are often designated in
choice-of-law clauses.77
Lawyers clearly are an important factor in motivating these states to
compete for choice-of-law business.78 Lawyers have significant advantages over other interest groups (such as taxpayers or low-wage workers)
in promoting the law market. Lawyers may have lower costs of political
advocacy than most groups because they can produce their own lobbying
activities and can coordinate their political activities through existing bar
associations. Lawyers also have incentives to invest their time in law reform because this helps them acquire an aura of professionalism and enhances their reputations for expertise in particular areas of the law.
Although lawyers can work on the law of any state, they have a special incentive to devote efforts to the law of the particular state in which
they are licensed79 because licensing laws give lawyers exclusive rights to
practice in the state’s courts, and they also help local lawyers in their efforts to advise clients who are based in the state.80 Because judges tend
to apply forum-state law, the right to practice in a particular court carries
with it an interest in that court’s local law. Also, firms may establish
connections with states in order to increase the chances that the state’s
law will apply to their contracts, and local investments often translate
into demand for local lawyers. It follows that the quality of a state’s legal
environment, including whether the state enforces contractual choice of
law, may affect a lawyer’s business. Lawyers therefore have an incentive
to improve the quality of their licensing state’s law in order to attract clients for transactional work and as litigants in local courts. Accordingly,
lawyers’ participation in lawmaking can serve the interests of both lawyers and clients. Given the importance of lawyers on the supply side of
the law market, it is not surprising that each of the states that have signaled their desire to compete in the law market by enacting choice-of-law
statutes has a large and sophisticated commercial bar that is seeking a national clientele for both litigation and transactional work.
The incentives emphasized in this article differ from those of lawyers who want local and state laws favorable to plaintiffs suing national
76. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1646.5 (West Supp. 2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2708 (2005); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 685.101 (West 2003); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/5-5 (West 2003); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG.
LAW § 5-1401 (Consol. 2007); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 35.51–.52 (Vernon 2002). The Texas
statute also provides for enforcement of choice-of-law provisions that choose other states’ laws provided that the transaction has a connection with the state whose law is chosen. For an analysis of these
statutes, see Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware, Lawyers, and Contractual Choice of Law, 19 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 999 (1994).
77. See infra Part IV.F.
78. See Ribstein, supra note 76 (discussing lawyers’ role in promulgation of state choice-of-law
statutes).
79. Because it is costly to be licensed in a particular state, lawyers tend to be licensed only in the
state where they reside and maybe one or two others.
80. See Larry E. Ribstein, Lawyers as Lawmakers: A Theory of Lawyer Licensing, 69 MO. L.
REV. 299, 302 (2004).
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firms, often as representatives of nationwide classes of plaintiffs. In the
class action cases, the plaintiff in effect unilaterally chooses the law by
choosing where to sue. By contrast, the law selected in a choice-of-law
clause must, in theory at least, appeal to both contracting parties.81 Thus,
lawyers interested in attracting choice-of-law business may tend to favor
different types of laws than those interested in attracting plaintiffs.
2.

Noncompeting States

Given that some states compete for choice-of-law business, why do
other states, whose lawyers are not competing effectively for national litigation and transactional business, cooperate with party efforts to choose
law? In other words, what motivates “noncompeting” states to enforce
choice-of-law clauses that would have the effect of sending litigation and
transactional work to the competing states? We have seen in subpart A
that, if states do not enforce contractual choice of law, parties can avoid
their borders and their courts by moving their assets to enforcing states.
However, we need to understand how that mobility translates into political incentives to enforce contractual choice of law despite the state lawmakers’ obvious interest in enforcing local mandatory laws. This requires an examination of the interest group dynamic in noncompeting
states created by party mobility.
To begin with, any regulation that has the effect of attracting or repelling business contributes or detracts from the state’s overall business
environment, and thereby may affect everybody who is a part of this environment. Businesses pay taxes that may exceed the costs of the services they consume. Businesses employ workers of all types and buy
goods and services from other businesses in the state. All of these beneficiaries of a favorable legal environment potentially can put pressure on
lawmakers to create such an environment.
In the standard political equation, regulation results from contention between interest groups that directly gain and lose from the regulation—that is, between “proregulatory” and “antiregulatory” groups. The
winner is the group that has the most political resources, which depends
not only on the size of the group but also on its costs of coordinating.82 A
relatively small group therefore may be able to successfully promote legislation that imposes net costs on society because the costs are borne by
individuals who have more difficulty coordinating. Most importantly for

81. This can be true whether the clause is negotiated or simply accepted as part of a standard
form by a consumer or other party. To be sure, there may be a question in some circumstances
whether the choice-of-law clause is priced into the contract. Our point here is only that there is a general distinction between the situation in which the law is specified ex ante in the contract and one in
which it is determined ex post by a party’s choice of where to sue.
82. See generally MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971) (providing a
comprehensive overview of group behavior).
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present purposes, the costs of state legislation may fall on out-of-state
firms while the benefits are incurred by powerful in-state groups.
Now add mobility to the political mix. Firms may leave the state to
avoid regulation, and this can harm those locals who profited from their
presence. These “exit-affected” interest groups may add their voice to
“antiregulatory” interest groups. To be sure, groups affected by the reduction of in-state business may not be very effective. For example,
there is evidence that low-wage service industry employees in particular
types of franchise outlets lost jobs as a result of franchise regulation.83
These employees have little ability to act as a group, and therefore have
much less political clout than existing franchisees. The latter can act as a
tightly coordinated group and are directly helped by franchise regulation.
Nevertheless, if franchisors and existing franchisees are closely matched
in political strength, the political scales might tip to franchisors if they are
joined by, or can make arguments on behalf of, exit-affected groups.
Exit also influences jurisdictional competition apart from contractual choice of law. Firms often leave states that impose high taxes or
regulatory costs. For example, an insurer might leave a state where liability costs are high or unpredictable.84 Firms’ physical exit or the threat
of exit might cause the state to enforce a choice-of-law clause choosing
the law of another state. But the state also might decide simply to refrain
from regulating or to deregulate. Given this choice, why is contractual
choice of law significant? If the threat of exit could deter regulation, why
should it matter whether these states enforce the parties’ choice of another state’s law?
Contractual choice of law is a distinct and important part of the political dynamic of jurisdictional competition. First, as discussed above,
firms and parties contract for law for reasons other than simply to avoid
mandatory rules.85 They seek a single governing law, a better fit, and desirable rules of contract interpretation. States recognize that these benefits are important enough to justify the enforcement of party choice in at
least some circumstances.
Second, enforcing contractual choice of law is often preferable to
deregulation. Political actors within a state might not know or be able to
agree on what should replace the bad laws, and yet all might acknowledge the need to enable mobile firms to avoid the law with a choice-oflaw clause. Enforcing choice-of-law clauses might be a workable political
compromise.
Third, contractual choice of law gives states a potentially valuable
mechanism for engaging in a form of political “price discrimination” between in-state and out-of-state firms. Enforcing choice-of-law clauses
83. See Klick et al., supra note 44.
84. See, e.g., Michael Kunzelman, State Farm: No New Policies in Miss., ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Feb. 14, 2007, available at http://abcnews.com/us/wirestory?id=2874970.
85. See supra Part I.A.1.
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can be especially useful for interstate firms. These firms tend to have
lower costs of exit than firms whose business is concentrated in the state
because interstate firms’ customers and suppliers are not confined to a
specific place, and because they are already informed about other states’
regulations. By keeping the regulation but letting firms avoid it through
contractual choice of law, legislatures can at least preserve some effect of
the regulation by imposing it on firms that have relatively high exit costs.
The “discrimination” is benign in the sense that it can offset the advantage that local firms have in interest group competition if out-of-state
firms lack an exit option.
B.

The Corporate Law Market

This subpart discusses the supply side of the corporate law market.
As with the demand side, we see similar forces operating in both the
general and corporate law markets. Again, it is useful to distinguish between “competing” states, the most important of which is Delaware, and
“noncompeting” states. Also, we continue to focus on the dynamic that
produced the IAD. Given the IAD, states other than Delaware can be
viewed as passively competing to retain incorporation business from
their firms.86 But the question for present purposes is not only what motivates a state like Delaware to provoke a competition for corporate law,
but also why other states play Delaware’s game rather than blocking this
competition by refusing to enforce the IAD.
1.

Competing States

The standard explanation of corporate law competition asserts that
states compete to obtain local incorporation fees.87 Delaware’s franchise
tax, which is imposed on all firms that incorporate in Delaware, is as high
as $150,000 per firm. In the aggregate, these franchise fees represent a
significant percentage of the state budget of the small state.88 The franchise fee story seems to disconnect the IAD from the rest of the law
market, since franchise fees do not explain enforcement of other types of
contractual choice of law.
The franchise tax helps explain the shape of the particular market
for publicly held corporations, which is dominated by a single state. Because of Delaware’s small size, it is unique in its reliance on the tax, and
therefore in the extent to which the franchise tax can “bond” it to commit to providing high-quality corporate law.89 In other states, the reve-

86. See infra Part IV.A.
87. See generally Cary, supra note 1.
88. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 556 (2002).
89. See infra text accompanying note 154.
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nue incentive would likely not be enough to bind legislators to refrain
from serving competing interest groups.90
The franchise tax cannot, however, fully account for Delaware’s
production of high-quality corporate law, and therefore falls short as an
explanation of how Delaware drives the market for corporate law. To be
sure, individual taxpayers obviously would want the state to get revenues
from corporate franchise fees rather than from individual income taxes
and sales taxes. But firms will not pay higher fees unless they get the sort
of benefits Delaware can provide. Even state legislators who care about
franchise tax revenues may not want to devote the time and energy necessary to providing a state-of-the-art corporation law and corporate infrastructure.91
In addition to the franchise tax, and consistent with the general law
market, lawyers are an explanation for the development of the corporate
law market and the IAD. For example, a lawyer named James B. Dill
was almost single-handedly responsible for promoting New Jersey’s corporation law.92 Delaware lawyers also have expressed their concern with
protecting Delaware’s law market,93 and have played a direct role in developing Delaware corporate law.94 The Delaware corporate bar drafts
the corporate laws for the legislature, which passes the lawyers’ recommendations verbatim.95 In return, lawyers reap the significant benefits of
a thriving corporate practice: Delaware lawyers’ income is fifty percent
higher than lawyers in comparable states.96 Lawyers are also a significant
force in developing corporate law outside of Delaware,97 and, as we will
see below in Part IV, they help jurisdictional competition for noncorporate business associations.
As with law generally,98 lawyers have a special incentive to develop
the corporate law of their home state even though any lawyer can develop an expertise in that law. For example, only lawyers licensed in
Delaware may practice regularly in Delaware courts. These courts, in
90. See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 88, at 580–83.
91. See Douglas J. Cumming & Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, The Role of Interjurisdictional Competition in Shaping Canadian Corporate Law, 20 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 141, 144–46 (2000) (noting that
most legislators do not gain enough from making their state’s law competitive to justify engaging proactively in law reform).
92. See MITCHELL, supra note 65, at 39–42.
93. See Roberta Romano, Is Regulatory Competition a Problem or Irrelevant for Corporate Governance?, 21 OXFORD REV. OF ECON. POL’Y 212, 218–21 (2005).
94. See Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and Agency, 15
DEL. J. CORP. L. 885, 899–901 (1990); William J. Carney, The Production of Corporate Law, 71 S. CAL.
L. REV. 715, 722–28 (1998); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 506–09 (1987); Ribstein, supra note 76, at 1009–
12.
95. See Alva, supra note 94, at 899–900.
96. See Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1946 (1998).
97. See generally Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate
Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679 (2002).
98. See supra Part II.A.1.
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fact, are a big reason why firms choose Delaware incorporation.99 Parties
to cases in Delaware courts must hire Delaware lawyers to at least act as
local counsel in litigation. Also, Delaware lawyers’ inside knowledge of
Delaware judges, procedures, and decisions could be expected to give
them an edge in drafting agreements that Delaware judges will interpret.
Delaware lawyers therefore have an incentive to write laws that will attract corporations, and their litigation, to Delaware.
2.

Noncompeting States

Neither the franchise tax nor lawyers can explain one important aspect of the corporate law market: why states that are not actively competing for out-of-state corporations enforce their local firms’ choice of
Delaware corporate law. It is, of course, this enforcement by other states
that enables the corporate law market to operate. In particular, if lawyers in states outside of Delaware want to encourage firms to incorporate
locally, why do they not oppose applying Delaware corporate law to locally based firms? After all, this would make lawyers’ expertise in their
state’s local corporate law all the more valuable.
There are at least three explanations for noncompeting states’ recognition of the IAD. Although each of these factors alone probably cannot explain states’ incentives, the factors arguably combine to motivate
noncompeting states to enforce the IAD. First, we have seen that in the
general law market exit-affected interest groups can put pressure on
states to enforce contractual choice of law in order to encourage firms to
maintain connections with their states.100 The same forces contribute to
the enforcement of the IAD in noncompeting states. If firms avoid
nonenforcing states, lawyers, for example, may lose potential clients and
litigation business.
Second, states have incentives to abide by a general rule that entitles their own corporate governance rules to respect in other states.
Courts understand that their decisions denying recognition of the IAD
could be used against their own state’s corporations.
Third, states have reason to be concerned about the fate of their
own corporate governance law if they attempt to apply it to a firm incorporated elsewhere based on slight local contacts (for example, the residence of a few shareholders). Because such a rule would impose high
costs on firms,101 this could invite a strong legal reaction. Even if the
IAD itself does not have constitutional status,102 a state’s attempt to regulate the internal governance of firms that are nearly purely foreign might
be unconstitutional under the Full Faith and Credit or Commerce
99.
100.
101.
102.

See infra text accompanying note 151.
See supra Part II.A.2.
See supra Part I.A.1.
See infra Part V.A (discussing constitutional protection of the IAD).
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Clause.103 Moreover, such regulation might be enough to unite management and shareholder groups to call for federal regulation of corporate
governance. Indeed, there was pressure for federal chartering of corporations in the early twentieth century.104
To be sure, states might impose their laws on firms that have a
strong local presence.105 This would at least avoid the harsh consequences of applying many state laws to a single corporation. But such a
rule could deter firms from making significant local investments, which
might trigger a local political backlash against the regulation. That may
explain why only New York and California—large, rich states that can
offer firms significant non-law benefits for locating there—have attempted this move.106 In other words, these states have a captive market
that local interest groups can exploit, in part, by lobbying to apply local
corporate law to foreign corporations.
Even if noncompeting states have incentives to enforce other states’
laws, they could choose to impose limits on enforcement of the IAD
similar to those applicable to noncorporate choice of law—that is, by requiring a connection between the parties and the designated state and
imposing a public policy exception on firm choice. However, the IAD is
more absolute than the general rules for enforcing contractual choice of
law. The next Part explains these differences in terms of the general
supply and demand forces in the market for law.
III. LIMITS ON ENFORCEMENT
This Part discusses the limits on enforcement of contractual choice
of law, in both the general and corporate law markets. We show how the
political dynamics created by the law market can perpetuate limitations
on the enforcement of the parties’ choice of governing law. Typical limitations include requirements that the law chosen have a connection to
the parties or transaction, and that it not violate the fundamental public
policy of interested states. Law market forces also help explain the situations in which these limitations are absent or have been eroded, particularly in the corporate law market.
Subpart A analyzes the limitations in the general law market, and
subpart B analyzes the absence of limitations in the corporate law market. Subpart C explores the incentives that firms and interest groups

103. See infra Part V.A (discussing constitutional standards for choice of law).
104. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
105. This is something like the “real seat” rule that applies in Europe. See infra Part IV.D.
106. Recent California cases are discussed in infra Part IV.D. New York has incentives similar to
California’s, and indeed has sought to regulate pseudo-foreign corporations. See P. John Kozyris,
Corporate Wars and Choice of Law, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1, 66–67 (discussing New York statutes applying
New York corporation law to foreign corporations). California has been more aggressive than New
York recently, perhaps because New York wants to build a reputation as an active competitor in the
market for law. See infra Part IV.F.
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might have, both in the general and in the corporate law markets, to respond to burdensome multistate regulation by seeking protection from
federal law. In particular, Congress can use its broad powers over interstate commerce to enact federal regulation that preempts inconsistent
state regulation. Conversely, proregulatory interest groups might attempt to prevent defeat or erosion of their regulatory interests by seeking federal regulation. Subpart D summarizes the analysis presented in
the first three Parts of the article.
A.

The General Law Market

Explaining the supply side of the law market not only helps explain
why states enforce party choice of law, but also accounts for the limitations on enforcing party choice. As discussed in the following sections,
enforcement of party choice in the general law market can be restricted
by both the connection requirement and the fundamental policy exception. In each case we will distinguish the incentives and resulting rules of
states that are actively competing for law business from those of noncompeting states.
1.

Connection Requirement

As a prerequisite to enforcing choice-of-law clauses, many courts
require a connection between the parties or transaction and the chosen
state.107 In contrast, no such rule exists in the market for corporate law.108
In understanding the relationship between the corporate and general law
markets, it is therefore important to focus on the political and policy reasons for connection requirements.
States’ motivations for imposing connection requirements can differ
for competing and noncompeting states. We begin with competing
states. Recall that a few states have enacted statutes mandating local
court enforcement of clauses choosing their law for high-value contracts.
Most of these statutes permit the parties to choose the enacting state’s
law without a connection with that state.109 Though the states merely invite parties to use their own laws, the statutes are still significant in inviting use of the state’s law by firms all over the country. Without a connection requirement, there is a question of what the state gains.
One possible explanation for the absence of a connection requirement in these statutes concerns the role lawyers have played in promoting them.110 Lawyers could be expected to favor local enforcement of
choice-of-law clauses even if the parties lack a connection with the state
107. See supra Part I.A.2.
108. See infra Part III.B.1.
109. See supra note 76. Florida has a slight connection requirement while Texas, which also permits choice of non-Texas law, requires a reasonable connection.
110. See generally Ribstein, supra note 76.
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because enforcement attracts contract litigation to the forum. To be
sure, transactional lawyers might instead prefer to use the statute to attract the firms to the state on the theory that in-state firms are more
likely to choose in-state lawyers. But as long as noncompeting states’
courts adhere to their connection requirement, this may induce some
firms to physically locate in the competing states in order to ensure enforcement of the choice-of-law clauses.
Now consider noncompeting states’ incentives when adjudicating a
contract designating a competing state’s law, whether or not pursuant to
a choice-of-law statute. Lawyers in noncompeting states derive much
less benefit from enforcing the parties’ choice of the law of competing
states because legal experts in the competing states are likely to have an
edge in attracting commercial litigation and transactional business. It
does not necessarily follow, however, that the noncompeting state courts
will never enforce the clause. As discussed above,111 they have an incentive not to deter firms from establishing contacts with the state. However, noncompeting states could be expected to require as a condition of
enforcing choice-of-law clauses that the parties have a connection with
the state whose law is chosen. Lawyers in noncompeting states would
want to constrain locally based firms from sending their law business to
one of the leading commercial jurisdictions. If the noncompeting state
requires a connection with the designated state as a condition of enforcing the choice-of-law clause, locally based firms might be inclined to settle for local law because they value their physical connection with the forum more than they value the competing state’s law. A firm whose
workers are basking in Arizona sun may not find it worthwhile to relocate to Delaware just for the latter’s law and courts. The noncompeting
state therefore may be able to “bundle” its law with its more desirable
attributes. If so, the connection requirement allows noncompeting states
to preserve their laws against drastic erosion by the law market.
Although a connection requirement might serve noncompeting
states’ interests in many cases, the rules on contractual choice of law recognize the possibility of enforcing commercial contracts without any
connection between the parties or transaction and the chosen jurisdiction. The Second Restatement says that even absent a substantive connection, another “reasonable basis” for the choice may be enough.112
The Reporter’s Note cites the famous English case of Vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co.,113 which enforced the contractual choice
of otherwise unrelated English law in a contract for shipment of goods
from Newfoundland to New York. The parties here wanted a set of familiar laws and, perhaps, to avoid potential home court bias favoring ei111. See supra Part II.A.2.
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2) (1971).
113. Vita Food Prod., Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co., Ltd., [1939] A.C. 277 (P.C. 1938) (appeal taken
from N.S.).
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ther side. Obviously, courts easily could expand this exception to acknowledge any of the reasons firms choose their governing laws.
This open-ended Restatement exception makes sense in light of the
general supply-side incentives of noncompeting states discussed in this
article. Recall that the connection requirement serves to protect a state’s
law-making prerogatives by forcing firms to balance the benefits of locating in their home state against those of using the law of a competing
state. This could backfire where firms derive enough benefit from the
competing state’s law that they might be willing to move if the connection requirement forces them to do so. Such moves could impose costs
on local lawyers and other exit-affected interest groups. Then it may
make sense for the noncompeting state to let the firm use the competing
state’s law even if it lacks a connection with that state. This may be true
not only in cases like Vita where the parties need some neutral law, but
also in cases where a particular jurisdiction has emerged as especially expert and unbiased.
2.

The “Fundamental Policy” Exception

Most states will refuse to enforce chosen law if it is contrary to an
interested state’s “fundamental policy.” This exception carves out a
category of “super-mandatory” rules that trump contractual provisions
not only under local law, but also as against the law of the contractually
selected jurisdiction. The Restatement provides that the trumping state
must be one that (1) would be selected under the most significant relationship test, and (2) “has a materially greater interest than the chosen
state in the determination of the particular issue.”114 Thus, a court determining whether the contractual choice is subject to a super-mandatory
rule must consider both the nature of the policy involved (i.e., whether it
is “fundamental”) and the level of the state’s interest in applying its policy to the relevant issue in the case.
Like the connection requirement, rules permitting regulating states
to trump contractual choice are both the product of and subject to the
disciplining effects of the supply and demand forces of the law market.
Whether a state will impose a super-mandatory rule depends on the
presence and relative political strength of proregulatory groups that favor the rule, antiregulatory groups that are directly burdened by the
regulation, and the exit-affected groups that stand to lose if the supermandatory nature of the regulation drives firms and individuals away
from the state. A state’s regulation has super-mandatory effect only if
the interest groups favoring the rule are stronger than both the antiregulatory and the exit-affected groups.

114.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2).
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Consider, for example, states’ treatment of choice-of-law clauses in
franchise contracts. When a state chooses to regulate the ability of franchisors to terminate their contracts with franchisees, the proregulatory
group of franchisees is often stronger than the antiregulatory group of
franchisors, who are usually based outside the state, plus the exit-affected
group of those whose jobs or product quality are affected by franchise
regulation.115 Employees, consumers, and others affected by a potential
decrease in franchises or outlets have high costs of organizing politically
relative to the benefits they could derive from this particular political action. In this situation, exit-affected groups remain impotent, and the legislature (or court) remains free to treat franchise regulation as a supermandatory rule. If, however, the exit-affected interest groups are well
represented in the legislature, then parties are more likely to remain free
to opt out of the regulation by choosing another state’s law.
It follows from these law market forces that courts must distinguish
between a merely mandatory statute, which reflects one outcome of a
contest between these three types of interest groups, and a supermandatory rule, which reflects a different political balance, one in which
exit-affected interest groups may lack strong political influence. In fact,
courts often seem to appreciate this distinction because they generally
enforce choice-of-law clauses except in a limited group of cases: franchise
and distributorship agreements, noncompetition provisions in employment contracts, loan interest rates, insurance contracts, and other consumer contracts involving choice-of-law provisions in standard form
agreements.116
In deciding whether to override contractual choice of law, courts
also have to determine which state’s fundamental policies will be taken
into account. The Second Restatement looks both to whether the trumping state would be the state whose law would be chosen under the most
significant relationship test and to whether the trumping state’s interest is
superior to that of the chosen state.117 A firm that wants to use a choiceof-law clause can help control whether a state’s fundamental policy will
override the clause through its choice of location for its headquarters or
other significant investments. This rule therefore helps to ensure that the
interests of exit-affected groups in both regulating and designated states
will be taken into account in determining which rules have supermandatory effect.
The competing states’ choice-of-law statutes118 allow enforcement of
choice-of-law clauses without regard to the public policies of other states
115. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
116. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 35, § 18.5, at 966–73; Ribstein, supra note 25, at 405–12; Giesela Ruehl, Party Autonomy in the Private International Law of Contracts: Transatlantic Convergence
and Economic Efficiency 16–20 (Comparative Research L. & Pol. Econ., CLPE Research Paper No.
4/2007, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=921842.
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2) (1971).
118. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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and even if the parties lack a local connection. Since the statute merely
invites the parties to use the enacting state’s law, the state is not trying to
override other states’ policy choices. But the statute does have the significant effect of inviting parties from all over the country, regardless of
lack of a local connection, to use the enacting state’s law to help ensure
enforcement of their contracts. This contrasts with the weighing of state
interests under the traditional Restatement rule for enforcing choice-oflaw clauses. As discussed above, the influence of its lawyers probably
explains the competing state’s willingness to be accommodating.119
Moreover, the states have only weak interests in regulating large commercial contracts where the parties are closely enough matched in expertise and bargaining power that they rarely need any regulatory assistance, much less super-mandatory rules. In short, for competing states,
the prime exit-affected group of lawyers overrides any proregulatory interests.
These choice-of-law statutes do not guarantee enforcement if plaintiff sues outside of the competing state. That forum may have no strong
lawyer or other interest group that wants to attract commercial transactions and litigation, and may have strong local interest groups that want
to prevent evasion of the noncompeting state’s statute. Although this is
unlikely for most large commercial transactions, some categories of
transactions, including those listed above,120 may trigger concerns within
the noncompeting state. On the other hand, even under the traditional
choice-of-law analysis, the statutes may identify an “interest” of the designated state in having its law applied. Moreover, under this article’s
analysis, even noncompeting states may have an incentive to limit their
use of the fundamental policy exception if applying the rule causes parties to avoid the state. Thus, the interaction between exit-affected and
proregulatory groups may erode limits on enforcing choice-of-law clauses
in noncompeting as well as competing states.
B.

The Corporate Law Market

The IAD at first glance seems strikingly different from the rules
governing choice-of-law clauses generally. In contrast to these general
rules, the IAD is enforced without any requirement of a connection between the corporation and the state of incorporation, and generally without a “fundamental policy” exception. However, this subpart shows that
the differences between the IAD and the general rules governing choiceof-law clauses are actually not as great as they seem, and can be explained by differences in the demand and supply forces across contract
types.

119.
120.

See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 116.
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Connection Requirement

Delaware applies its corporate law to firms that have no connection
with the state. This follows from the supply-side of the corporate competition.121 Because of its franchise tax, Delaware’s incorporation business
confers benefits on the state’s taxpayers regardless of whether the corporation has any contacts with the state. Even apart from the franchise fee,
however, Delaware lawyers would want to attract both litigation and its
associated transactional work. Requiring in-state connections for incorporation would only limit the local lawyers’ market. Thus, the IAD rule
operates according to incentives that are similar to those that produced
the competing states’ choice-of-law statutes for high-value commercial
transactions which similarly lack a connection requirement.122
It might seem harder to explain why courts outside of Delaware also
apply the IAD even to firms that lack a connection with the incorporating state. But this too makes sense given the general law market forces
described in this article. First, the IAD can be analyzed as an extension
of the Vita exception to the connection requirement123 applied to choice
of corporate law. Consistent with our analysis of that exception, firms
gain so much from being able to contract for corporate governance law
that noncompeting states fear firms’ moving their home offices or avoiding contacts with them if they imposed a connection requirement.
Second, even if these risks of losing firms by imposing a connection
requirement are only slight, noncompeting states also have little to gain
from insisting on a connection requirement. As discussed in the next
subpart, most important policy questions concerning corporate governance are not covered by the IAD. Restrictions on party choice of law
typically require strong interest-group support. With little demand to
protect the few mandatory rules that fall within the IAD, restrictions on
contractual choice, including the connection requirement, are unlikely.
2.

Fundamental Policy Exception: The IAD as Optical Illusion

Even if firm mobility and lawyers’ interests encourage enforcement
of the IAD, other local interest groups often would rather have the state
apply local regulation than the more permissive law of another state.
The presence of these competing interests explains the “fundamental
policy” exception to enforcement of choice-of-law clauses for contracts
generally. Yet the courts do not recognize such an exception for the
IAD. This seems odd in light of the controversies perennially raging in
Congress and in the press about corporate governance, some of which
include the Enron-era scandals, executive compensation, shareholder

121.
122.
123.

See supra Part II.B.1.
See supra Part I.D.
See supra text accompanying note 113.
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voting, fraud, and protection of nonshareholder “stakeholders.” These
controversies, though heated, have not yet threatened the IAD. Politically powerful groups like organized labor, for example, could seek to
shape corporate law to promote their interests, and it might seem that
protecting labor’s interests would require relaxing the IAD to protect
employees outside the incorporating state. Shareholder interests are
probably too diffuse to block such regulation even if it reduced shareholder wealth.124 So why is there no fundamental policy exception to the
IAD?
It is not surprising that Delaware, the leading corporate jurisdiction,
has few mandatory corporate rules. Delaware is small enough that its incorporation fees really matter to its fiscal health, while it lacks the interest groups that might agitate for enforcing local public policies against
foreign corporations. This was also true in New Jersey when it began
competing for charters.
The puzzle concerning the lack of super-mandatory corporate rules
concerns states other than Delaware that are called on to apply the IAD
to Delaware corporations doing business locally. The explanation for
Delaware’s passivity applies to few other states. For example, by the
time Wilson became governor of New Jersey, that state was developing
industries and alternative sources of revenue, and through these industries was also feeling the costs of monopolization its laws were imposing
elsewhere.125 Why, then, is the IAD enforced without the usual “fundamental policy” exceptions outside of Delaware? Surely courts and legislatures could, if they wanted to, view at least ordinary investors who own
shares in publicly traded corporations as equivalent to the unsophisticated individuals who are protected by super-mandatory rules in other
contexts.
At least two factors can explain the absence of a fundamental policy
exception to the IAD. First, there is only weak pressure for supermandatory corporate governance rules. Consider the positions of groups
that would be most interested in the sort of corporate governance issues
covered by the IAD—shareholders and creditors. In the early days of
the private corporation, before strong public securities markets, shareholders would have been able to protect themselves through voting provisions in corporate charters. When public securities markets developed,
dispersed and passive shareholders might have needed legal protection
from strong managers. But noncontrolling shareholders were a diffuse
group, with no organizations that could have coordinated their lobbying.
Similarly, creditors might have needed protection from owners’ manipulation of corporate assets, particularly after legislatures and courts recognized limited liability of shareholders for corporate debts. But banks and
other large creditors could insist on contractual protection, while small
124.
125.

See Coates, supra note 68 (discussing the potential influence of these interest groups).
See Grandy, supra note 59.
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trade creditors were no more able than shareholders to coordinate politically. Tort creditors, such as accident victims, were weak until trial lawyers became a potent force in speaking for them, by which time corporate features were well established, accounting and disclosure technology
provided significant protection for creditors,126 and trial lawyers had
plenty of corporate assets to go after. In short, possible legal protections
often proved either unnecessary or unattainable.
Second, any pressure for legal protections that does exist has been
channeled off into rules outside the area covered by the IAD. In other
words, the IAD is a sort of optical illusion: it looks absolute because its
scope has been limited to the area in which it can operate absolutely.
Most public policy concerns are expressed through laws that do not fall
within the IAD itself. For example, organized labor seeks employee protections in labor law. Constraints on corporate size once imposed by the
capital limits of early special charters127 were left to the antitrust laws.
Creditors’ direct rights against the firm are contained in the loan agreements and are therefore subject to conflict of laws principles that apply
to contracts generally. In contrast to internal governance matters like
shareholder voting, the benefits of being able to choose a single firmwide
rule are lower for agreements with creditors. The IAD is limited to covering creditor-protection rules that concern shareholders’ financial rights,
including shareholders’ personal liability for corporate harms, obligations
to commit their capital to the firm, and restrictions on distributions to
owners that increase the risk that the firm will not be able to pay its
debts. These rules mostly affect smaller creditors who, as discussed
above in this section, are less powerful as an interest group than the
combination of the antiregulatory and exit-affected interest groups that
support the IAD.
Consider also states’ securities, or “blue sky,” statutes that specify
disclosure rules for securities transactions. These laws apply to transactions occurring in the state,128 which is often the investor’s home state, regardless of the location of the company’s incorporation. This exception
to the IAD can be explained partly by the lower costs of enforcing local
law in this situation: local actions by investors do not threaten firmwide
governance rules such as those dealing with shareholder voting. Moreover, in contrast to the relatively weak interest groups that might oppose
the IAD, strong interest groups really cared about state securities regulation in the early twentieth century. Proregulation groups here included
relatively well-organized regional securities firms and local banks that
feared the big New York investment banks.129 More recently, trial law126. See generally Henry Hansmann et al., Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1333
(2006).
127. See Tung, supra note 9, at 61.
128. See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 610, 7C U.L.A. 207 (2006).
129. See Macey & Miller, supra note 94 (discussing the influence of small banks and local industries on the enactment of blue sky laws).
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yers have promoted state securities regulation as an end-run around federal restrictions on securities fraud claims.130
Ethics rules for professional firms also lie outside the IAD. In general, ethics rules regulate the conduct of individual professionals based
on where they practice and are not really part of “corporate” law. But
some professional ethics rules, such as those specifying the members’ vicarious liability for the firm’s debts, have at least as much impact on the
firm’s governance as the rules that are subject to the IAD.131 A publicly
held corporation, therefore, may not practice law in the United States
and accountants and other professionals may not co-own a law firm. The
persistence of these rules can be explained by the power of professional
groups who want to restrict competition. For example, the rule restricting who may own the firm’s shares protects professionals from having
bosses who do not share their interests.132 Because professional groups
are among the most powerful and cohesive interest groups, they would
be formidable opponents of enforcing contractual choice of law.133
These exceptions to the IAD show that corporate governance, if
broadly construed to include matters that are technically outside the
IAD, actually is subject to the same anti-contractual-choice pressures
that affect other types of contracts. The success of opponents of contractual choice depends on the same factors that matter elsewhere in the law
market, including the benefits of contractual choice, the costs and benefits of exit, and, as discussed in the next subpart, the role of federal law in
mitigating the costs imposed by multiple state regulators. The only difference is that the exceptions have developed outside the IAD, thereby
preserving the apparent absoluteness of the doctrine.

130. See Larry E. Ribstein, Dabit, Preemption, and Choice of Law, 2006 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 141,
146 [hereinafter Ribstein, Dabit, Preemption, and Choice of Law]. There is a separate question
whether firms and investors should be able to choose the applicable securities law. See Stephen J.
Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities
Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1997) (arguing for allowing this choice); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998) [hereinafter Romano, Empowering Investors] (same). This would not necessarily lead to a race to the bottom:
firms have voluntary “bonded” the accuracy and completeness of their disclosures by voluntarily subjecting themselves to higher disclosure standards than in their home countries. See Larry E. Ribstein,
Cross-Listing and Regulatory Competition, 1 REV. L. & ECON. 97 (2005) [hereinafter Ribstein, CrossListing and Regulatory Competition], available at http://www.bepress.com/rle/vol1/iss1/art7. Also, securities prices have been shown to reflect disclosure differences across countries. See Roberta
Romano, The Need For Competition In International Securities Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES
L. 387 (2001) [hereinafter Romano, The Need for Competition] (summarizing studies), available at
http://bepress.com/til/default/vol2/iss2/art1.
131. For a discussion of the effect and politics of these rules in the law firm setting, see Larry E.
Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Law Firm Structure and Choice of Law, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 1161 (2001).
132. See Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs and Law Firm Structure, 84 VA. L. REV.
1707, 1721 (1998).
133. As with creditor and securities rules, there is a separate question whether there should be
jurisdictional competition as to ethical rules as well.
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The Federal Role

No examination of the IAD would be complete without considering
the important role of federal law. We have seen that states may impose
super-mandatory rules in the general law market and similarly regulate
corporate governance in significant ways outside the IAD.134 When these
laws threaten to subject national firms to numerous state regulators,
business groups may lobby for a single federal law to regulate the area
and preempt inconsistent state laws. Conversely, proregulatory groups
may lobby for federal regulation that supersedes the IAD, or other
treatment of contractual choice of law, in order to facilitate supermandatory state or federal laws. Thus, federal law is part of the optical
illusion of the IAD: it provides another way to move contentious issues,
such as bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, and other laws that otherwise
might trigger exceptions to the IAD, outside the scope of that rule.135
Consider, for example, the federal government’s role in protecting
creditors of insolvent corporations. Although the IAD generally applies
in this area,136 federal law creates certain deviations from the IAD. A
bankrupt firm is managed by the trustee in bankruptcy, which may be the
corporation’s managers if the corporation is being reorganized under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.137 Some bankruptcy courts have allowed creditors to sue shareholders or managers derivatively on behalf of
the insolvent corporation if the trustee in bankruptcy refuses to bring the
suit.138 If the court allows the suit, it effectively subjects corporate management to federal bankruptcy law rather than the law of the state of incorporation. For example, some cases suggest that the corporation or its
managers may have a special federal fiduciary duty to creditors that transcends the creditors’ specific rights under their loan agreement or state
law.139
The federal role in corporate governance is particularly important
because of its potentially dynamic effect. Once Congress has passed a
law, firms may press the courts to expand the law’s preemptive effect,
and thereby slowly erode state law. Although the Supreme Court gener-

134. See supra Part III.B.2.
135. See Mark Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003) (discussing the increasing federalization of corporate law).
136. See, e.g., Prod. Res. Group v. NCT Group, 863 A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 2004).
137. Keith Sharfman, Derivative Suits in Bankruptcy, 10 STAN. J.L. & FIN. 24 (2004).
138. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548
(3d Cir. 2003) (allowing creditors committee to sue derivatively); In re Commodore Int’l Ltd., 262 F.3d
96 (2d Cir. 2001) (also allowing creditors committee to sue derivatively with the approval of the bankruptcy court). Others have questioned the right to bring such an action under the Bankruptcy Code.
See In re Fox, 305 B.R. 912 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2004) (denying standing to bring a § 548 claim);
Sharfman, supra note 137 (discussing cases and questioning availability of derivative remedy).
139. For a critique of these cases, see Larry E. Ribstein & Kelli Alces, Directors’ Duties in Failing
Firms, J. BUS. & TECH. L. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=880074.
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ally has presumed against preempting state law,140 it has departed from
that presumption in areas of the law dominated by federal regulation,
such as securities law.141
So far the federal government generally has stayed out of issues the
states have chosen to keep within the IAD. Thus, a move in 1914 to consider federal chartering of corporations ended with a failed proposal for
federal licensing or franchising that would have preserved state incorporation.142 By this time, because the IAD was widely accepted, there was
no need for federal law to protect firms from multiple state laws. However, the federal government’s quiescence as to issues falling within the
IAD may not continue. Congress responded to Enron and related scandals with the broadest federal regulation of corporate governance since
the Depression—the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.143 Federal regulation in this
area might continue to expand in response either to state supermandatory laws or to the perceived inadequacy of state regulation.
The risk of federal government action might cause proregulatory interest groups to pause before seeking state regulation that could motivate antiregulatory groups to seek federal preemption. Because the risk
of federal action may depend on whether state regulations impose costs
on firms outside the state, interest groups have some incentive to limit
their regulatory initiatives to those that mainly affect firms that are
closely connected to the state. The potential for federal action also might
cause antiregulatory groups to accede to state regulation of corporate
governance that, while imposing new burdens, is less costly than broadening federal regulation. When Congress preempts state law, it completely ousts the states from regulating in that area. Interest groups acting at the state level must constantly balance the benefits they derive
from enacting particular regulation against the possibility of losing their
jurisdiction entirely. In this sense, state law operates in the shadow of
federal law.144
D.

Summary

The market for corporate law is not as different from that for contract law generally as it might seem at first glance. In both cases parties
demand the benefits of contractual choice of law, and they make that
demand felt in the law market through their basic ability to move among
jurisdictions. Exit-affected interest groups, particularly lawyers, respond

140. See Bates v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518
U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
141. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 87–89 (2006).
142. See MITCHELL, supra note 65, ch. 5.
143. See Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204,
116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 18 U.S.C.).
144. For an analogous point, see Roe, supra note 135 (arguing that Delaware in effect competes
with federal law because of the threat of federal preemption).
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by pressuring state governments to allow parties to shop for law. In both
cases the market is limited by state regulation that trumps contractual
choice in particular situations, and by federal law that preempts state law
when multiple state regulations threaten to impede national trade. The
one apparent distinction between the corporate and the general markets—the fact that the IAD requires no connection between the parties
or transaction and the designated state—is readily explained by the same
political considerations that underlie the general law market. Moreover,
the general law market also dispenses with the connection requirement
in equivalent circumstances. Thus, it is misleading to examine the corporate law market as a distinct phenomenon, and much more intellectually
profitable to understand the common forces underlying markets for corporate as well as other contract law.
IV. THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATE LAW MARKET
The academic writing on the corporate law market has so far focused on a relatively narrow slice of that market occupied by publicly
held corporations. Scholars have argued over whether this slice involves
a “race to the bottom,” as William Cary suggested.145 The literature suggests that the competition for the provision of corporate law is defective
because of Delaware’s overwhelming market share. Moreover, Delaware’s dominance seems to be abetted by the IAD, which permits corporate law to be divorced from the place of operation.
This Part shows that the debate has drawn a misleading picture of
the corporate law market. We provide a corrective by broadening the
analysis to discuss the markets for many types of business associations
and analogous entity-creating or -modifying contracts. Here we turn
from a discussion of the development of the IAD to a discussion of the
market for corporate law that has developed as a result of the IAD. We
show that the processes discussed in Parts I–III above are at work
throughout the many aspects of the law market. While the processes
have different consequences in each setting, their important role in different contexts suggests that the corporate law market is shaped by these
ongoing market and political forces rather than being the inevitable result of particular historical circumstances or legal rules. As discussed below in Part V, this analysis has important policy and theoretical implications.
Subpart A begins on conventional ground by discussing publicly
held corporations. This subpart undercuts the notion that Delaware’s
apparent dominance sets the market for publicly held corporation law
apart from the processes we have described. Subparts B, C, and D describe other business associations that are subject to versions of the IAD,

145.

See supra text accompanying note 1.
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including closely held business associations, publicly held unincorporated
firms, and European corporations. Subparts E, F, and G discuss markets
that are not subject to the IAD but nevertheless involve processes similar
to those operating in corporate and general law markets: international
securities regulation, commercial contracts, and trusts. Subpart H summarizes the implications of this Part’s analysis.
A.

Publicly Held Corporations

Given scholars’ focus on the market for publicly held corporations,
it is not surprising that the corporate law market seems unique. Delaware overwhelmingly leads all other states by incorporating more than
half of public corporations.146 Delaware’s dominance is reflected in the
profits it makes from its franchise fees. No other aspect of the law market operates through a franchise fee mechanism. However, we have
shown that even the Delaware phenomenon can be explained by the
general forces underlying the law market. Elsewhere in this Part we will
show that Delaware dominates only one aspect of the corporate law
market. Here we will show that Delaware’s leading role in the market
for publicly held corporations does not imply the absence of a viable
market for law even with respect to this corner of the law market.
Several possible reasons have been given for Delaware’s dominance.147 First, Delaware may have the sort of “network” advantages
that have been attributed to, for example, computer operating systems.148
The many Delaware corporations produce cases and common practices,
and those practices help to clarify contract terms over time.149 These advantages can “lock in” Delaware law against even more efficient competitors.150 Second, Delaware offers a legal “infrastructure” consisting of
146. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate
Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775, 1810 (2002) (finding Delaware’s share to be fifty-eight percent of publicly
traded nonfinancial firms).
147. See id. at 1784–97 (reviewing these explanations).
148. See Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 332, 334–36
(1985).
149. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the
Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261, 286–89 (1985).
150. For discussions of the network externalities and related theories in the context of business
associations, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate
Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds: Bondholder Protection or Management Entrenchment?, 40 UCLA L.
REV. 931 (1993); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347 (1996); Marcel Kahan &
Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of
Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997); Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757 (1995). See also Ehud Kamar, Beyond Competition for Incorporations, 94 GEO. L.J. 1725 (2006) (arguing that Delaware’s legal indeterminacy enables it to increase
network effects and thereby to hold onto its dominant position). For skepticism about the network
externalities theory, see S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 J.L. & ECON.
1 (1990); S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, 8 J.
ECON. PERSP. 133 (1994) (showing that it may be impossible to tell whether a product, or corporate
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the country’s most expert corporate court and bar. A would-be competitor would have to make a large investment in developing such an infrastructure.151 Meanwhile, Delaware could quickly respond to any other
state’s attempt to actively compete with it.152 Third, a competitor state
also would have to provide assurances as to its future lawmaking and adjudication. An important function of corporate law is its ability to
change over time. Because amending a public corporation’s charter is a
costly and cumbersome process, it may be hard for corporations to
change their contracts to efficiently account for changing circumstances
that a firm will face over its long life. Firms, therefore, must trust the
state to make necessary changes.153 At the same time, corporations must
hope that the state’s politicians do not change the corporation laws in
ways that reduce corporate wealth—as New Jersey did when it enacted
its antitrust law at the beginning of the 20th century. Delaware’s dependence on franchise taxes uniquely “bonds” its commitment to avoid
similar compromises.154
Delaware’s dominance matters because of its possible effect on the
efficiency of the state competition for corporate law. This dominance is
the current turn in the debate William Cary began with his “race to the
bottom” paper.155 Commentators responded that efficient securities
markets discipline firms’ choice of state of incorporation.156 But an efficient securities market can only discipline the choice among available
competitors. Firms’ positive reaction to Delaware incorporation there-

statute, is losing the competition because users like to stick with an inferior product’s “network,” or
just because the winning product is actually superior). For skepticism about the application of the
theory to corporate law, see Romano, supra note 130, at 514–19. For evidence that the network externalities theory did not prevent development of a new type of closely held business association, see
Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Choice of Form and Network Externalities, 43 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 79 (2001).
151. Note, however, that the investment may not be large compared to a state’s overall budget.
Kahan & Kamar, supra note 97, at 725, suggest it would cost less than $2 million a year.
152. See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 88, at 585–95.
153. See Henry Hansmann, Corporation and Contract, 8 AM. L. ECON. REV. 1, 7–10 (2006).
154. See Roberta Romano, Law as Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 225, 231 (1985).
155. Cary, supra note 1; see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992).
156. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 212–18 (1991); Daniel R. Fischel, The “Race to the Bottom” Revisited: Reflections on
Recent Developments in Delaware’s Corporation Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913, 918–19 (1982); Romano,
supra note 154, at 229–30; Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of
the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 256 (1977). There is evidence that the stock market rewards
firms that reincorporate in Delaware from another jurisdiction. See Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich,
The Market for Corporate Charters: “Unhealthy Competition” Versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. BUS.
259, 274–75 (1980); Romano, The Need for Competition, supra note 130, at 495–97 (reviewing eight
studies finding positive abnormal stock returns from changing incorporation state); Romano, supra
note 154, at 232. There is also evidence that the market gives a higher value to Delaware corporations
than firms incorporated in other states. See Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm
Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 527 (2001) (documenting that Delaware firms had higher “Tobin’s Q’s”
than non-Delaware firms in a study covering the period 1981–1996).
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fore may be attributable not to the high quality of Delaware law, but to
the fact that the market produces few competitors.157
Although Delaware undoubtedly has a significant market share of
incorporations of public firms, this does not mean the market is not competitive. Delaware attracts about fifty percent of incorporations by new
public firms,158 and a little more than half of all publicly traded corporations,159 with most of the rest incorporating in their home states. Given
Delaware’s supposed significant competitive advantages, one might ask
why Delaware’s dominance in these areas is not greater. Scholars have
offered several explanations, most of which are skeptical of the existence
of a healthy competition for corporate law.160 For example, Robert
Daines presents evidence showing that the choice of the home state correlates with the use of a local rather than national law firm.161 But correlation is not necessarily causation. Firms may be choosing their lawyers
based on their incorporation choices. There is also evidence that states
use antitakeover statutes to attract incorporations,162 and competing evidence that firms are seeking flexible rules and high-quality judicial systems rather than takeover protection.163 Michael Klausner concludes that
the evidence overall does not support a vigorous competition for corporate law.164
Despite these scholars’ skepticism, competition with home states for
incorporation business may be enough to provide realistic market discipline for corporate law.165 This is indicated by the facts that corporate
law innovations spread through the states in the same way that innovations in competitive markets have been shown to spread,166 and that
states earn franchise revenues in proportion to their willingness to respond to changes in the market with innovative legislation.167 However,
the franchise tax cannot explain why non-Delaware states would seek to
keep their locally based corporations from incorporating in Delaware.
157. See Oren Bar-Gill, Michal Barzuza & Lucian Bebchuk, The Market for Corporate Law, 162
J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 134 passim (2006); Kahan & Kamar, supra note 97, at 685–
86.
158. See Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1571
(2002).
159. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 146, at 1810.
160. See Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later, 31
J. CORP. L. 779, 786–89 (2006) (reviewing the literature).
161. Daines, supra note 158.
162. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L. &
ECON. 383, 387 (2003).
163. See Marcel Kahan, The Demand for Corporate Law: Statutory Flexibility, Judicial Quality, or
Takeover Protection?, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 340 (2006).
164. See Klausner, supra note 160, at 797.
165. See Romano, supra note 154, at 226.
166. See Carney, supra note 94, at 720, 734; Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal
Innovation and State Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209, 231 (2006) (showing rapid diffusion of corporate law changes, but resistance to anti-takeover laws in Delaware as compared with states where labor has more influence).
167. See Romano, supra note 166, at 236–40.
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Delaware is one of only a couple of states that charge a fee based on the
size of the corporation (most importantly, according to the number of
shares) and for which franchise taxes provide enough profit to motivate
the state to compete.168 Where franchise fees are a tiny part of the
budget, taxpayers would care little about attracting incorporations. In
fact, states compete, in part, because their lawyers have strong incentives
to keep corporations at home, and thereby increase the value of local legal expertise, rather than sending corporations off to Delaware lawyers.
In other words, the influence of lawyers explains the competition for
corporate law just as it helps explain the supply side of the noncorporate
competition.
A study of the corporate law market as a piece of the overall market
for law can contribute to this debate over Delaware’s dominance. As
discussed so far in this article, the corporate law market and the rules
governing it are driven by the same forces that underlie competition for
other law. Exit-affected groups in corporations’ home states will not
readily cede the advantages of attracting public incorporations. These
groups include not only lawyers, but also those who benefit from corporations’ local headquarters or other connections. As we will see below in
subpart F, firms’ incorporation at home arguably supports this link between the corporate and general law markets insofar as they seek the advantages of local contract law, and not just local corporate law. In this
sense Delaware’s corporate law competes in the market for contracts.
B.

Closely Held Business Associations

An important question for present purposes is whether Delaware’s
apparent dominance indicates that there is something special about the
corporate law market. In fact, this phenomenon of dominance by a single state exists only for publicly held firms in the U.S. federal system and
not in other contexts in which the IAD is applied. Indeed, the market for
closely held firms looks quite different from the market for publicly held
firms. Although the IAD traditionally was linked to the corporate form,
and therefore did not traditionally apply to unincorporated firms,169 this
has changed significantly over the last generation. Choice-of-law clauses
are now enforced so commonly in general partnerships that the rule
closely resembles the IAD.170 The same is true regarding the market for
168.
169.

See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 88, at 556; Kahan & Kamar, supra note 97, at 724–26.
See Jennifer J. Johnson, Risky Business: Choice-of-Law and the Unincorporated Entity, 1 J.
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 249, 275 (1997); Ribstein, supra note 14, at 268; see also Thomas E.
Rutledge, To Boldly Go Where You Have Not Been Told You May Go: LLCs, LLPs, and LLLPs in
Interstate Transactions, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 205, 213 (2006).
170. See ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP
§ 1.04 (1988 & Supp.). However, in the absence of a clear statutory rule, the common law of conflictof-laws may apply. The common law may apply the general contract choice-of-law rule rather than the
IAD if the firm is a partnership, though probably not if it is an LLC. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 298 (defining “corporation” for choice-of-law purposes). It is conceivable that
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limited liability partnership-type entities such as the limited liability
company (LLC), to which the IAD also has been applied.171 Thus, notwithstanding the IAD, the usual supply and demand forces that underlie
the law market are at work for firms’ choice of governing law. The relative influence of differing choices is due to different competitive conditions in each of these submarkets.
The market does not, however, resemble that for public corporation
law. Several factors impede the development of a Delaware-type market
for “tramp” closely held firms. Closely held firms’ costs of operating
outside the formation state, which include paying a foreign-firm fee for
operating at home, are likely to be high compared to the money invested
in the firm.172 Conversely, publicly held firms must operate as foreign
firms in some states whether or not they incorporate in their residence
state, and so have low marginal costs of shopping for law.173
More importantly, publicly held firms get higher benefits than do
closely held firms from the “network” of corporate law.174 Publicly held
firms face the prospect of many shareholder suits in which such law will
be applied. Closely held firms, by contrast, are likely to endure such a
suit only once, when the relationship falls apart. Publicly held firms also
benefit from being on the same standard with other publicly held firms
because this facilitates trading of their shares in public securities markets.
These factors mean that public corporations are willing to pay Delaware
enough to give it an incentive to maintain a substantial infrastructure,
and to post a “bond” to secure the future direction of its law.175
Notwithstanding these differences between publicly and closely held
firms, there is evidence that states have actively competed to supply the
law of closely held unincorporated firms, particularly including LLCs,
and that this competition has led to efficient legal rules.176 Although
applying the contract rule may mean that partner’s liability is governed by the law of the plaintiff’s
residence rather than that of the state of formation. See id. § 298. See generally Rutledge, supra note
169, at 238–42.
171. See LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANIES § 13:4 (2d ed. 2004).
172. See Ian Ayres, Judging Close Corporations in the Age of Statutes, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 365, 374–
75 (1992); Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 88, at 573 (showing evidence that larger firms are more
likely than smaller firms to incorporate outside home state).
173. Roberta Romano, State Competition for Close Corporation Charters: A Commentary, 70
WASH. U. L.Q. 409, 413 (1992) (arguing that there is relatively little competition for such firms because the transaction cost benefits of closely held firm statutes are relatively low).
174. See supra text accompanying note 148.
175. For a formal model of the attributes of the market for corporations which stresses the difference between firms that do and do not demand significant infrastructure, see Oren Bar-Gill et al., supra note 157.
176. See Carol R. Goforth, The Rise of the Limited Liability Company: Evidence of a Race Between the States, But Heading Where?, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1193 (1995) (showing evidence that lawyers and others participated in competition regarding LLC laws); Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Evolution and Spontaneous Uniformity: Evidence from the Evolution of the Limited Liability
Company, 34 ECON. INQUIRY 464 (1996) (showing evidence of evolution of state LLC statutes toward
efficient level of uniformity); Larry E. Ribstein, Statutory Forms for Closely Held Firms: Theories and
Evidence from LLCs, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 369, 430–31 (1995).
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there is no equivalent to Delaware in the closely held firm market, data
on LLC formations in 2005 indicate that Florida has emerged as a clear
leader, with Delaware next but far behind Florida, and several states
bunched not far behind Delaware.177 The leadership of Delaware and
Florida in LLC formations does not reflect their standing in population
relative to other states.178
The Florida data suggests that in the market for closely held firms a
dominant state emerges by promoting both basic business activity and
business formations. Florida’s investment attractions include an active
real estate market, fueled by retirement, tourism, and a large homestead
exemption for sheltering debt from bankruptcy;179 a thriving small service
business in the real estate, tourist, and retirement industries; an estate
planning industry generated by Florida’s large retirement community;
and an important destination for Latin American immigrants. The Florida bar has used the LLC form to exploit these advantages in a number
of ways, including by making it tax friendly, reducing fees, and crafting
the statute to fit estate planning and asset protection needs.180 The payoff of these efforts and factors is that, according to data from the Florida
Secretary of State, formations of Florida LLCs increased from 1892 formations in 1996 to 130,558 in 2005, an increase of 6900%. Meanwhile,
formations of for-profit Florida corporations during the same period increased from 104,173 to 168,182, or 62%.181
It is not clear how to separate Florida’s supply of law for corporate
and LLC formations from its role in attracting investments. Florida’s at177. Specifically, Florida had 123,437 formations that year, followed by Delaware at 87,360. Data
on LLC formations is compiled by the International Association of Corporate Administrators. INT’L
ASS’N OF COMMERCIAL ADM’RS, ANNUAL REPORT OF JURISDICTIONS 39–48 (2005), available at
http://www.iaca.org/downloads/AnnualReports/2006_AR.pdf.
178. Other leading states include California (59,431), Texas (53,101), New Jersey (51,668), Arizona (48,663), New York (48,564), Colorado (45,302), Georgia (41,063), and Ohio (40,180). Florida is
fourth in population after California, Texas, and New York. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RESIDENT
POPULATION OF THE 50 STATES, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, AND PUERTO RICO: CENSUS 2000
(2000), available at http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/tab02.pdf.
179. The Florida homestead exemption, which is ensconced in a constitutional provision, protects
an unlimited value of property provided that it occupies no more than a half acre within a municipality
or 160 acres outside of a municipality. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4.
180. Florida revised its statute in 1999 and 2002 to increase usability, particularly for small firms
and as retirement and debt-protection vehicles. These revisions, among other things, clarified provisions for single member LLCs, clarified veil-piercing standards, removed the requirement to estimate
capital contributions, ensured lack of marketability and minority interest discounts for use in estate
planning, and offered debtor protection by denying creditors the right to foreclose on charging orders.
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.433 (West 2007) (denying creditors the right to foreclose on charging orders); id. § 608.701 (applying corporate veil piercing case law to LLC context); id. § 608.4211 (removing requirement to estimate capital contributions); see also id. §§ 608.401–.705; Florida Asset Protection Blog, http://floridaassetprotection.blogs.com/alperlaw/2005/01/thoughts_about_html (Jan. 11,
2005) (noting that “the Florida legislature changed the law to specifically permit a single member
LLC”). For example, until fairly recently, non-foreclosure on charging orders was an asset protection
provision. See Larry E. Ribstein, Reverse Limited Liability and the Design of Business Associations, 30
DEL. J. CORP. L. 199 (2005).
181. See Florida Division of Corporations Annual Statistics, http://webarchive.org/web/2006/
109034657/http://www.dos.state.fl.us/doc/corp_stat.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2008).
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tractive business environment might have drawn investments even from
firms that are organized elsewhere. On the other hand, Florida’s activities in drawing investments might have motivated it also to try to attract
business formations, since it could expect that firms that were already
based in Florida would be inclined to invest there. Thus, Florida might
be competing simultaneously in a chartering market for closely held
firms and in a state market for investments. The Florida evidence therefore indicates that there may be no clear separation between the “unbundled” corporate market for law alone and the “bundled” market for
law and other attributes of establishing connections with a state. While it
is not clear precisely what factors are driving Florida’s success, the data
suggest the importance of further studying the law market in the light of
the general forces driving the market for law rather than the supposedly
unique characteristics of the market for corporate law.
C.

The Market for Publicly Held Unincorporated Firms

The LLC formation data indicate that the Delaware phenomenon
depends on the publicly held nature of the entity rather than on the type
of business association. This suggests that Delaware should be dominant
in the market for publicly held unincorporated firms as well. And, indeed, Delaware does dominate the market for publicly held or “master”
limited partnerships.182 Delaware does not, however, dominate the market for all types of publicly held firms. Other states have shown that they
can take over submarkets for specific types of publicly held firms by tailoring their statutes to these firms’ needs. Again, the underlying supply
and demand forces in the market for law account for the structure of the
market.
With respect to statutory business trusts, Massachusetts is a close
competitor with Delaware in the number of firms (although Delaware
has a significant lead in new formations of these firms).183 Most mutual
funds are either Massachusetts business trusts or Maryland corporations,
although Delaware statutory trusts are rapidly catching up.184 Maryland
has nearly all of the market for real estate investment trusts (REITs) and
has always led in providing a statutory vehicle for these instruments.185
Among other things, Maryland has no franchise tax and offers takeover
182. See generally John Goodgame, Master Limited Partnership Governance, 60 BUS. LAW. 471
(2005).
183. In The Rise of the Statutory Business Trust (in progress), Robert H. Sitkoff shows that in 2005
Delaware had 14,164 of these firms, Massachusetts 10,535, and Connecticut 1529, though Delaware
had far more formations of these firms than both other states—3200, compared to a total of 262 in the
other states.
184. Id. (relying on data from the Investment Company Institute). Many closed end funds are
Delaware limited partnerships, bringing Delaware’s total entity share in that category close to the
shares of Massachusetts and Maryland.
185. See David M. Einhorn et al., REIT M&A Transactions—Peculiarities and Complications, 55
BUS. LAW. 693, 698 n.26 (2000).
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protection, shareholder restrictions, director powers, and other provisions that are specially tailored to REITS.186
These types of firms share the characteristic that their terms are
heavily governed by federal law, including the Investment Company Act
of 1940187 for mutual funds formed as statutory business trusts and the
REIT provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.188 In these narrow and
heavily regulated areas, Delaware’s unique lawmaking advantages are
less important. These firms, therefore, would be less inclined than publicly held corporations to pay Delaware’s substantial franchise fee, and
cheaper states can emerge as dominant.
These niche business associations are another indication of the
IAD’s relatively small role in determining the shape of the corporate law
market. Not only is Delaware not dominant outside of the publicly held
firm context, but even within this context it faces effective competition in
some circumstances, especially when federal law plays a significant role.
The market for publicly held unincorporated firms suggests that
policymakers should examine the general market for law. Specifically,
increased federal regulation of firm governance might loosen Delaware’s
dominance by reducing the advantages to firms of Delaware’s courts and
laws. If so, the competition for state business association law will grow
more robust even as it becomes less consequential. On the other hand,
Delaware’s apparent ability to compete even under these more constrained circumstances suggests that Delaware may have competitive advantages that remain unappreciated because of the traditional narrow focus on the market for public corporation law.
D.

Europe

Recent European developments show how the IAD can emerge in a
context that differs significantly from the early history of the U.S. corporation. This helps refute the historical explanation for corporate uniqueness. Although Europe has long applied the so-called “real seat” rule,
pursuant to which the governing law is that of the country where the
firm’s administrative office is located, recent European case law has
adopted a version of the IAD. European corporate law can therefore
further test the effect of the IAD and its relationship to the general law
market.

186. See National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, The REIT Story,
http://investinreits.com/learn/reitstory.cfm (last visited Jan. 5, 2008). REITs are actually corporations
formed under a special section of the Maryland Corporations and Associations Code, §§ 8-101 to 8801. However, Maryland REITs share features with unincorporated firms. See Larry E. Ribstein, The
Rise of the Uncorporation (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
187. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (2000).
188. See I.R.C. § 856 (2000) (providing rules for qualification of REITs for pass-through taxation).
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The big break in the European market came in 1999 with the Centros case,189 in which the European Court of Justice (ECJ) held that
Denmark could not bar a United Kingdom (UK) corporation from opening a “branch” in Denmark merely because the corporation had never
done business in the UK. The company relied on the “right of establishment” in what is now Article 48 of the Treaty of Rome, which provides that companies formed in accordance with member state law shall
“be treated in the same way as natural persons who are nationals of
Member States.”190 The ECJ held that this protection was available even
if the company simply wanted the more favorable law of the incorporation jurisdiction, rather than having some other business purpose for expanding from its home base.191 The same court later held that denying a
Dutch corporation the right to sue in Germany because its real seat was
in the Netherlands was contrary to the right of establishment.192 This cast
doubt on the survival in Europe of the real seat rule. A third case held
that the right of establishment in Article 48 not only trumped a prohibition on local registration, as in Centros, but also barred the Netherlands
from imposing local regulations on a company that was based locally but
incorporated elsewhere solely in order to avoid these regulations.193 In
general, these cases clarified that the European Union (EU) constitution
protects full-fledged Delaware-type charter competition for “tramp” or,
in European parlance, “brass plate” corporations.194
Centros and other cases evidently have provoked at least some
European competition in the form of “tramp” UK incorporations by
companies based elsewhere in Europe, as well as responses by other
European countries, particularly by revising their minimum capitalization requirements and simplifying incorporation requirements.195 But
189. Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. I-1459.
190. Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 8, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (c340) 3 [hereinafter E.C. Treaty].
191. See Centros, 1999 E.C.R. at I-1497–I-1498.
192. Case C-208/00, Überseering BV v. Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH
(NCC), 2002 E.C.R. I-9919.
193. Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd.,
2003 E.C.R. 1-10155.
194. European countries can still inhibit jurisdictional competition if justified “on grounds of public policy, public security or public health” under Article 46 of the Treaty of Rome. E.C. Treaty, supra
note 190, art 46. Countries can also regulate outside of company law, such as by imposing legal capital
type regulation under insolvency laws. See John Armour, Who Should Make Corporate Law? EC
Legislation versus Regulatory Competition (ECGI-Law Working Paper No. 54/2005, 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=860444. They can also inhibit firms’ ability to reincorporate in other countries, which would be a real constraint on the charter market. See Case 81/87, The Queen. H.M.
Treasury and Comm’rs of Inland Revenue, ex parte Daily Mail and General Trust PLC, 1988 E.C.R.
5483 on the interpretation of Articles 52 and 58 of the EEC Treaty and the provisions of Council Directive 73/148 of 21 May 1973 on the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence within the
Community for nationals of Member States with regard to establishment and the provision of services
(holding that the right of establishment did not prevent the UK from blocking transfer of a company’s
headquarters to another country to keep the company from avoiding payment of capital gains tax).
195. Marco Becht et al., Where Do Firms Incorporate? Deregulation and the Cost of Entry 23
(Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 70, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
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competition under Europe’s version of the IAD so far seems to be following a different track from the United States. European firms form in
the UK not because of its law or courts but simply because it is a cheaper
place to incorporate.196 The UK tramp firms are not the big Fortune 500type companies that Delaware specializes in, but smaller companies for
which incorporation costs are significant. These firms arguably do not
need law as much as they need cheap recognition. Thus, Europe is arguably not yet a market for law in same sense as the U.S. corporate law
market.
Europe may or may not be poised on the brink of becoming a fullscale corporate-type law market, as was the U.S. more than a century ago
when New Jersey began to attract “tramp” corporations. There are at
least three significant impediments in Europe to U.S.-style charter competition. First, differences in law, language, and custom among European Community (EC) countries transcend any in the United States.
Firms accordingly would find it difficult to operate in one country while
litigating in another country, or under another country’s law.197
Second, as would be expected from legislation at the level of the nation rather than a small state like Delaware, interest groups are likely to
interject their concerns into corporate law. In particular, labor’s participation on corporate boards, or “codetermination,” remains a contentious
issue in some European countries.
Third, and most importantly, it is not clear whether any country has
the incentive to become the European “Delaware”—the active driver of
EC charter competition.198 The EC limits a country’s gains from chartering fees and taxes.199 Even if European law allowed member countries to
profit from such fees, it is unlikely any European country could earn
enough fees to have the sort of incentive Delaware gets from the combination of its small size and dominant position in the competition.200 Although the UK is emerging as the leader in tramp incorporations, so far
it has made no significant changes in its law in order to attract incorpora906066 found an increase in UK incorporations of firms not physically located in the UK, mostly coming from other EU countries subject to the Centros rule. Specifically, they found that the average
number of European private limited companies incorporating in the U.K. increased from 4,600 firms
per year before Centros to 28,000 firms per year afterward, totaling over 120,000 firms between 1997
and 2006, including 48,000 from Germany.
196. See id.
197. See, e.g., Martin Gelter, The Structure of Regulatory Competition in European Corporate
Law, 5 J. CORP. L. STUD. 247 (2005) (discussing use of UK corporations in Germany and the Netherlands).
198. See id. at 257–62; Töbias Hans Troger, Choice of Jurisdiction in European Corporate Law—
Perspectives of European Corporate Governance, 6 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 3, 63 (2005); Marco Ventoruzzo, ‘Cost-Based’ and ‘Rule-Based’ Regulatory Competition: Markets for Corporate Charters in the
U.S. and in the EU, 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 91, 130 (2006).
199. See Council Directive Concerning Indirect Taxes on the Raising of Capital 69/335, 1968–1969
O.J. Spec. Eo. (1249) 25 (EEC). For analyses of the significance of this restrictions, see Armour, supra
note 194; Gelter, supra note 197; Kamar, supra note 150.
200. See Gelter, supra note 197 at 253–62. Note that Liechtenstein is not subject to the limitation
on charter fees, but it competes mainly as a tax haven rather than for incorporations.
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tions. Europe therefore may test the importance of franchise fees in developing a U.S.-style charter market.
On the other hand, some believe that U.S.-style competition might
eventually break out in Europe, with England probably playing the role
of Delaware.201 Firms may come to demand not just cheaper incorporation, but also flexible laws and expert judges. In particular, the UK has
delegated much of its securities law to responsive private lawmaking by
the London Stock Exchange. As with the corporate and other law market competition, lawyers may heavily influence the supply side of the
European corporate law market. It is as misleading in Europe as in the
United States to focus on franchise taxes and incorporation fees as a
main driver of the law market. The “charmed circle” of leading international UK law firms acts as an intermediary in the corporate law market,
and therefore can attract European corporations to the UK. As in
Delaware, the lawyers are likely to influence UK law to compete for
chartering business.
Indeed, one factor favors the emergence of an even more active law
market in Europe than in the United States: the relative inability of the
EC to effectively replace member-state corporate law. Mark Roe theorizes that the ever-present threat of federal regulation constrains U.S.
corporate competition.202 This is less a problem in Europe since the EC
regulatory apparatus is exceedingly slow and cumbersome. Europe’s recent moves toward the IAD reflect at least partly the central government’s failure to harmonize corporate governance. So even if European
countries themselves have weaker incentives to compete to supply corporate law—and this is not clear given the rise of the UK—this weakness
might be offset by a weaker federal constraint on competition.203
In general, although Europe has different competitive conditions
than the United States: the same basic principles prevail in both contexts.
Legislators in both systems seek to regulate corporate governance just as
they do other types of contracts. However, firms are mobile, and the UK
has catered to this market, at least to the extent of lowering incorporation costs for small firms. Moreover, European countries’ efforts to
block this competition provoked a federal response. In Europe, this response so far has been in favor of choice of law, in the form of the ECJ’s
decision in Centros, rather than federal corporate law regulations.
Europe may move closer to the United States based on the same forces
that have been important in the United States, particularly including the
role of lawyers.
On the other hand, if European jurisdictional competition continues
to develop along a different track from the United States, it is important
to emphasize that this will occur despite the existence of a choice-of-law
201.
202.
203.

See Armour, supra note 194, at 29–32.
See supra text accompanying note 135.
See Gelter, supra note 197, at 265–69.
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rule for corporate governance similar to the U.S. IAD. This tends to refute the notion that the U.S. corporate law market is attributable to the
IAD and the unique circumstances of its birth. Any differences between
the United States and the EU will not be because different forces are at
work, but because the specific environment affects the strength of each
of these forces—the demand for regulation (i.e., firms’ mobility because
of different local conditions), the supply of regulation (i.e., the local bar),
and the resistance of local proregulatory interest groups (i.e., labor).
E.

International Securities Regulation

International securities regulation seems far removed from the IAD
because it operates on the national level rather than within a federal system like the United States or Europe. However, recent developments in
international securities regulation show that forces similar to those operating on corporate law within federal systems are also operating on international securities laws. Although federal securities laws arguably circumvent the IAD by displacing state law,204 there is a market in
international securities regulation that displays some of the same competitive processes as the market for state corporate law. Indeed, the international market for securities regulations threatens continued dominance of the U.S. federal role in securities regulation.
One example of the influence of jurisdictional competition involves
issuers (in particular Lloyd’s of London) selling securities to U.S. investors and inserting clauses in their stock sale agreements choosing English
law and forum. Federal securities statutes specifically prohibit issuers
from attempting to contract around U.S. securities laws,205 so one might
predict that U.S. courts would treat the securities laws as supermandatory rules. Nevertheless, these clauses have generally been enforced.206 Congress, of course, could further tighten the securities laws to
provide that choice-of-law clauses in securities sales agreements are unenforceable. However, it is unlikely to do so because the demand side of
the market, particularly including the ability to resort to arbitration,
would likely significantly reduce the impact of any regulation that Congress feasibly could impose. Moreover, on the supply side, interest

204. See supra Part III.C.
205. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (2000) (“Any condition, stipulation, or provision
binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter
or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void.”); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (2000) (“Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an
exchange required thereby shall be void.”).
206. See Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 148 F.3d 1285, 1291–95 (11th Cir. 1998);
Richards v. Lloyd’s of London, 135 F.3d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1998); Haynsworth v. The Corp., 121 F.3d
956, 969 (5th Cir. 1997); Allen v. Lloyd’s of London, 94 F.3d 923, 929 (4th Cir. 1996); Bonny v. Society
of Lloyd’s, 3 F.3d 156, 161–62 (7th Cir. 1993); Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd’s, 996 F.2d 1353, 1361–65 (2d
Cir. 1993); Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953, 957 (10th Cir. 1992).
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groups in the United States may have an incentive to preserve access by
individual U.S. investors to overseas offerings, and choice-of-law and
court or arbitration clauses may be necessary to preserve that access.
Another route to jurisdictional competition in securities regulation
is through the cross-listing market—that is, the listing of firms on securities exchanges outside their home country. The demand side of this
market consists of firms that seek to “bond” their disclosures by willingly
subjecting themselves to tight U.S. disclosure standards and fraud
rules.207 On the supply side, interest groups in cross-listing countries, including lawyers, accountants, and investment bankers, get significant
benefits from cross-listing and therefore incur costs if cross-listings dry
up. This law market is quite competitive, since cross-listing firms can
fairly easily avoid the United States and stay home or go to other capital
markets like London if the cross-listing country raises the cost or lowers
the benefit of its regulation. All of this was brought home with a thud
when foreign companies started avoiding the United States after the
adoption of stringent new regulation in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.208 For
example, while in 1999 and 2000, foreign IPOs on U.S. exchanges raised
ten times the amount raised in London, in 2005 London exchanges raised
over $4 billion more than U.S. exchanges.209
The cross-listing market is not strictly comparable to the IAD because cross-listing issuers are subject to both home country and U.S. law.
However, competition for cross-listings might lead to a more conventional type of law market in which firms can select a single regulator
rather than exposing themselves to burdens imposed by multiple regulators. The U.S. interest groups affected by the exodus of cross-listers have
pressured Congress and the SEC to wholly or partially exempt foreign
issuers from U.S. law.210 Exempting foreign issuers from U.S. laws could
make U.S.-based issuers wonder why they should have to compete in
their own market for capital at a disadvantage to foreigners. They may
have the political clout to demand the same ability to opt out of U.S.
regulations. And if both U.S. and foreign firms can trade in the United
States under a foreign country’s law, why not under a state’s law? After
all, U.S. investors probably would be more protected under state law because it would be easier for them to litigate in Delaware than in, say,
Lichtenstein. Thus, regulation and nonenforcement of contractual
choice of law create an incentive to leave, and exit activates local industries that depend on the exiting firms. This, in turn, pressures politicians
207. See Ribstein, Dabit, Preemption, and Choice of Law, supra note 130, at 167.
208. See Ribstein, Cross-Listing and Regulatory Competition, supra note 130, at 124–29. For recent data on the effect of Sarbanes-Oxley on the cross-listing market, see the Interim Report of the
Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (Dec. 5, 2006), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/
pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf.
209. Roberta S. Karmel, NYSE-Euronext Merger: NYSE is Losing Listings to Foreign Exchanges,
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 17, 2006, at 3.
210. See Ribstein, Cross-Listing and Regulatory Competition, supra note 130, at 119.
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to enable jurisdictional choice, sometimes even for immobile locals. In
short, the elements of the law market story apply in the international
context.
F.

The Market for Commercial Contracts

The notion of the uniqueness of the corporate law market is further
undermined by its similarity to the market for some non-corporategovernance contracts. Eisenberg and Miller have shown that New York
has a significant share of the general choice-of-law market for commercial contracts,211 although Delaware also occupies a leading role in this
market as well. Their review of several hundred merger and acquisition
contracts, a context similar to the governance contracts covered by the
IAD, found that while Delaware was the place of incorporation for 189
of the merged corporations, only 132 chose Delaware law for the merger
agreement.212 By contrast, there were only eight New York corporations
in the set, but forty-five contracted for New York law in the merger
agreement. Thus, although Delaware has managed to figure prominently
in this market even in the absence of the IAD, it falls short of its dominance in the corporate market.
There is a possible connection between this market for noncorporate law and the one for public corporation law. As discussed in subpart
A, there is a “home bias” in the corporate competition—publicly held
firms tend to incorporate either in Delaware or in their home states.213
Similarly, Eisenberg and Miller found that when Delaware corporations
do not choose Delaware law for their merger contracts they often choose
the state where the business is located.214 These firms may be doing so
partly because linking the firm’s physical location with the designated
law will make it more likely that the choice-of-law clause will be enforced.215 Firms that incorporate at home rather than in Delaware may
have a related objective. Incorporation might be viewed as a contact that
increases the chance that the non-chosen state courts216 will apply the
chosen state’s noncorporate law in otherwise close cases. For example, if
a plaintiff consumer resides in a state with a strong pro-consumer law
such as California, the decision whether to enforce the choice-of-law
clause designating, say, New York, might turn on whether New York was
211. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 24.
212. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 25, at 1982.
213. See supra text accompanying note 158.
214. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 25, at 1988–2001.
215. Although these are large commercial contracts for which many commercial jurisdictions have
abandoned a connection requirement, establishing a connection with the designated state may help
promote enforcement in cases brought outside the designated state. See supra Part I.D.
216. The designated state may not require a connection with itself because it is a major commercial jurisdiction whose lawyers want to attract commercial litigation to the state. See supra Part I.D.
However, another state may require such a connection in order to limit the ease with which firms can
avoid its laws.
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the defendant’s state of incorporation. Also, in a large international
transaction that is likely to be adjudicated in the U.S., but where the parties have a strong preference for non-U.S. law, a U.S. court may be more
likely to apply foreign law if the relevant firm is also incorporated in the
foreign country. For example, consider Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Superior
Court217 which involved an international multiparty shareholders’ agreement to buy a Hong Kong corporation’s shares and operate the firm as a
joint venture. The California court enforced the contract’s choice of
Hong Kong law, relying substantially on the fact that the subject firm was
incorporated in Hong Kong.218 Even if the state-of-incorporation factor
in enforcement is not large, firms that engage in repeated transactions in
which these issues arise will want to maximize the likelihood of success
over the range of cases.
This analysis provides a further indication that, rather than being insulated from noncorporate choice of law, the corporate law market is actually related to it. Although Delaware has no national competitor for
choice of law, it must compete at the local level with states that attract
connections for general choice-of-law purposes. The relevance of firms’
connections with states may lead firms to incorporate in states other than
Delaware. Delaware has to maintain its general lawmaking excellence in
order to compete in this broader market. To be sure, this explanation for
the home bias is speculative at this point. But the data at least suggests
yet another advantage of viewing the competition for corporate law from
the perspective of the broader law market rather than as a unique phenomenon.
G.

Trusts

Trust law is another area of the market for unincorporated contracts that resembles the corporate law market even without the IAD.
Trusts can designate the applicable law in the trust instrument, but this
designation is subject to general choice-of-law rules requiring some connection between the trust and the designated state.219 Recently, however,
trust law has been subject to a competition that resembles what has happened in public corporation law.220
Again, the general forces of the law market explain what has happened. The trust law market was spurred by the 1986 change in tax law
that allowed people to use trusts to make tax-free intergenerational
wealth transfers while avoiding gift and inheritance taxes.221 However,
settlors had to contend with the Rule Against Perpetuities (RAP), which
217. 834 P.2d 1148 (Cal. 1992).
218. See id. at 1153, 1155–56.
219. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS §§ 270, 272 (1971).
220. See Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds:
An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 416–17 (2005).
221. See id. at 370–72 (discussing tax changes and their effect on trust competition).
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invalidates restrictions on property, particularly including in trust instruments,222 effective for long than the life of anyone alive at the time of
the transfer (a “life in being”) plus 21 years. The new tax benefit of perpetual trusts created a demand to free trusts of the RAP and, in turn, a
competition for trust funds. Delaware was first to see the opportunity
and abolished the RAP in 1995, explicitly acknowledging the intent to
participate in a competition for trust law, and several states followed suit
over the next three years.223
This state competition is particularly interesting for present purposes because of why states were willing to supply the perpetual trust
market. One might think that states wanted to levy taxes on the trust assets, analogous to the standard franchise tax explanation for the corporate charter competition. But Sitkoff and Schanzenbach convincingly refute this explanation by showing that trust assets increased after the
abolition of RAP only in the states that did not tax trusts they attracted
from out of state.224 This is not surprising, because as long as some states
did not charge tax, settlors establishing trusts in states other than where
they live would, all else equal, choose a state that did not charge the tax.
The puzzle is on the supply side: why would states participate in the
competition even if they were not reaping tax revenues? The important
beneficiaries of the competition for trust law turned out to be lawyers, as
well as bankers who earn significant fees from organizing and managing
trusts. States abolishing the RAP attracted $100 billion in additional
trust assets, which based on standard fee schedules translates into about
$1 billion a year in trustees’ commissions.225 Lawyers undoubtedly
earned significant fees from forming and managing trusts.226
In short, the competition for trusts is another example of the forces
at work throughout the law market: party mobility drives the demand
side and exit-affected interest groups (especially including lawyers) drive
the supply side. The result of this law market competition is significant
changes in the underlying law.
H.

Summary

This Part confirms the implications of Parts I–III: the corporate law
market is not a unique phenomenon, but rather one component of the
222. See id. at 366 n.26 (noting that “[t]oday, because almost all life estates and future interests
are created in trust rather than as legal interests, the Rule’s primary modern application is to interests
in trusts funded with stocks, bonds, and other liquid financial assets”).
223. See id. at 376.
224. Id. at 386, 394–98.
225. Id. at 410–11.
226. Note that the corporate franchise tax “bonds” Delaware to continue to provide high-quality
law. See supra text accompanying note 90. Accordingly, it might seem that the absence of a tax motivation for state trust law might lead to lower quality law. However, it is probably the case that trust
law does not require the same sort of continuous updating that is important for corporate law, so
bonding future performance is less necessary.
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overall market for law. The market for public corporation law is actually
not overwhelmingly dominated by Delaware. Rather, Delaware has only
about half the market, while the other states are successfully competing
for the other half, arguably because of factors relating to the general law
market. Moreover, the markets for closely held firms, publicly held unincorporated firms, and European firms all exhibit different characteristics although the IAD applies to all of them. At the same time, the market for international securities regulation, commercial contracts, and
trusts looks similar to that for public corporations despite the fact that
the IAD does not apply to that market. In short, the idea of a unique
market for corporate law does not stand up to a more general analysis of
the markets for business associations and other laws. Rather, the differences are best explained by differences in the relative strengths of the
same forces underlying the law market generally: demand-side mobility,
supply-side competition motivated by exit-affected interest groups, and
constraints imposed by proregulatory groups at the state and federal levels.
V. IMPLICATIONS
This article shows that the IAD and the market for corporate law
are not attributable to unique features of corporations, but rather are
specific applications of the general forces that apply to contracting for
law. Firms have the same reasons for choosing the law that applies to
their governance that they do for choosing the applicable law in other
contexts. The IAD does not spring from the unique history of corporate
law. As in other contexts, courts enforce contracts choosing corporate
governance law despite their erosion of states’ power to regulate because
refusal to do so may cause corporations to avoid making investments in
regulating states, which would harm local interest groups, or might trigger a federal reaction in order to protect the operation of multistate
firms. The corporate law market therefore involves the same tension between proregulatory, antiregulatory, and exit-affected interest groups
that underlies contractual choice of law in other contexts. Indeed, the
congruence of the corporate and general law markets is further indicated
by the facts that many different business associations are covered by the
same choice-of-law rule, and that contracts covered by a different choiceof-law rule have choice-of-law features similar to those found under the
IAD.
This Part explores some legal and policy implications of our insight.
Subpart A argues that the law market lens undermines claims that the
IAD should be given constitutional status. Subpart B discusses the implications for the debate on the contractual nature of the corporation.
Subparts C and D discuss how this article’s analysis helps settle conflicts
between state and federal law, and among state corporate laws. Subpart
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E summarizes some general implications of the analysis for future scholarship.
A.

Constitutional Protection of the IAD

An implication of the historical explanation of the corporate law
market is the notion that courts are constitutionally compelled to apply
the IAD. After all, if corporations owe their existence and allegiance to
the state that created them, presumably other states are constrained to
apply that state’s law. However, the IAD never has been entitled to constitutional protection, including during the period when the IAD was developed. It is even clearer that no such protection exists today to account
for the continued viability of the rule.
Three constitutional provisions are relevant. The Full Faith and
Credit Clause empowers Congress to decide the respect that each U.S.
state must give to other states’ laws.227 The Due Process Clause228 implicitly guarantees to the parties minimal standards of fairness in litigation,
including the right to be protected from unfair surprise regarding the
governing law. Finally, the Commerce Clause229 empowers Congress to
regulate interstate commerce, and in its “negative” form prevents states
from usurping the federal role by enacting regulations that unreasonably
interfere with interstate commerce.230
The Court has approached, without quite reaching the result of, giving the IAD constitutional status under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause.231 Most of the cases involved members of fraternal benefit associations who joined a local lodge and agreed to pay periodic assessments
to the national organization. Because the organization agreed to make
payments to the member’s family when the member died, it functioned
as a nonprofit insurer. When a member or beneficiary made claims
against the organization, the Court consistently held that the member’s
rights must be determined according to the organization’s formation
state law. Because members paid assessments into a common fund, the
Court deemed it important to the success of the organization that the

227. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect
thereof.”).
228. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . . . .”).
229. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (providing that Congress has the power “[t]o regulate commerce . . . among the several States . . . .”).
230. The Equal Protection and Privileges and Immunities Clauses arguably also constrain choiceof-law approaches that discriminate in favor of state residents or against out-of-state residents. However, the Privileges and Immunities Clause applies only to persons, not entities, and the Equal Protection Clause has never been used to strike a state’s choice-of-law policies. We therefore do not consider these clauses in our analysis.
231. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.

RIBSTEIN.DOC

No. 2]

2/26/2008 10:44:42 AM

CORPORATIONS AND THE MARKET FOR LAW

717

members have uniform rights to the proceeds of the fund.232 This need
for a single governing law seems particularly compelling in a case like
Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum v. Green,233 where the law of the
state of the organization’s formation was held to control an issue regarding members’ assessments. Obviously it would be very hard for the organization to operate effectively when members’ contributions are subject to different rules in each state. But the rule was also applied in less
exigent circumstances such as Order of United Commercial Travelers v.
Wolfe,234 where a notice-of-claim provision in the association’s constitution was enforced despite a law in the member’s state of residence invalidating contractual shortening of the limitations period. Surely differing
limitations periods would have interfered with the day to day operations
of the Order.
The Court, however, has never applied these formation-state cases
to a business corporation. It came closest in Broderick v. Rosner,235 which
held that New Jersey could not prevent a New York bank from suing its
New Jersey shareholders under New York law. The Court, citing a fraternal benefit association case, said that “the act of becoming a member
(of a corporation) is something more than a contract, it is entering into a
complex and abiding relation, and as marriage looks to domicile, membership looks to and must be governed by the law of the State granting
the incorporation.”236
But the Broderick case involved whether New Jersey could thwart
an assessment by a New York official, which was akin to a court order
and therefore specifically covered by the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
This leaves open the question whether a New Jersey court would have
been required to enter a judgment consistent with New York law if there
had been no prior court order equivalent in New York.
Whatever the constitutional support for the IAD before the mid1930s, this support is much weaker now after Allstate Insurance Co v.
Hague237 has effectively merged Full Faith and Credit and Due Process
for choice-of-law purposes.238 In Hague, the Court let Minnesota apply
its rule “stacking” uninsured motorist coverage for three vehicles owned
by an insured rather than the different rule in Wisconsin. The Minnesota

232. Order of United Commercial Travelors of Am. v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 614 (1947).
233. 237 U.S. 531, 546 (1915).
234. 331 U.S. 586, 624–25 (1947). For similar cases, see Sovereign Camp of Woodmen of the
World v. Bolin, 305 U.S. 66, 78 (1938) (enforcing bylaw providing that member’s obligations would
cease after twenty years against claim that bylaw was ultra vires); Sovereign Camp, 305 U.S. at 78–79
(authority of society to forgive member assessments after 20 years to be determined according to law
where the society was formed); Modern Woodmen of America v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544, 551 (1925) (enforcing bylaw concerning effect of member’s prolonged absence rather than presumption-of-death
law).
235. 294 U.S. 629, 643–44 (1935).
236. Id. (citing Modern Woodmen, 267 U.S. at 551).
237. 449 U.S. 302, 320 (1981).
238. Id. at 308 n.10.
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rule applied although the policy was issued and the insured resided in
Wisconsin because the decedent worked in Minnesota, his widow became a Minnesota resident after the accident, and the insurer was doing
business in Minnesota. The majority thought there was “no element of
unfair surprise or frustration of legitimate expectations as a result of
Minnesota’s choice of its law.”239 Justice Stevens, concurring, said that
the parties’ expectations are significant under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause,240 and suggested that the Due Process Clause would raise fairness
concerns if the parties had made their expectations explicit by providing
for application of a particular law.241 In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts242
the Court applied this expectations test in refusing to allow a Kansas
court to apply forum state law in a nationwide class action, reasoning
that because some of the leases had nothing to do with the State of Kansas, the parties did not expect the forum’s law to control when they executed the leases.243
These cases indicate that the constitutionality of a choice-of-law
rule depends on whether parties should anticipate at the time of the
transaction that the law of any state with a connection to that transaction
might apply. If a state attempts to apply wholly unrelated law to that
transaction, as Kansas did in Shutts, then the Court may strike down that
choice on Full Faith and Credit and Due Process grounds. Although
these clauses protect the parties against arbitrary choices of law, they
would not compel enforcement of choice-of-law clauses. A constitutionally mandated IAD is similarly unlikely.
The Commerce Clause provides an alternative constitutional basis
for the IAD. Because the Clause most clearly prevents only overt discrimination against interstate commerce,244 one might think it clearly
would not prevent a state from applying the same law to a foreign corporation that it applies to its own firms. But the Court also has used the
Clause to protect against a state’s imposing costs on parties in other
states by effectively regulating interstate commerce. For example, the
Court struck down state regulation of the length of interstate trains,245
and trucks,246 and an Illinois law requiring a type of mudguard that differed from the type permitted in forty-five states and required in at least
one.247 Forcing trucks to change mudguards at the state line obviously
239. Id. at 318 n.24.
240. Id. at 324 n.11.
241. Id. at 328–29.
242. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
243. Id. at 822.
244. See Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1092 (1986) (suggesting that the Court should
merely prevent states from engaging in purposeful economic protectionism).
245. See S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 781–82 (1945).
246. See Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 678–79 (1981); Raymond Motor
Trans., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 447–48 (1978).
247. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 529–30 (1959).
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inhibits interstate commerce. Closer to the IAD, in Edgar v. Mite
Corp.,248 a plurality of the Court applied this principle to invalidate an Illinois law that regulated national tender offers to shareholders residing in
Illinois.249 By contrast, the Court held in CTS Corp. v Dynamics Corp. of
America,250 that the Commerce Clause supported the application of the
IAD to allow Indiana to regulate a tender offer for control of an Indiana
corporation.251
These cases seem to suggest that the Commerce Clause permits only
the state of incorporation to regulate corporate governance. The supreme court of Delaware—the state that has the most to gain from the
IAD—thinks that the IAD is therefore constitutionally protected.252
California courts disagree, upholding the constitutionality of the state’s
“outreach” statute regulating the internal governance of firms with significant California contacts.253 The statute provides that California law
controls a number of internal governance issues if a foreign company
conducts at least half of its business in California and California residents
hold at least fifty percent of the company’s voting securities.254
California has the better argument. The Court has never held that
the Commerce Clause precludes a state from regulating the internal governance of a firm incorporated under another state’s law. Violations of
the IAD often can, but do not necessarily, involve the sort of insuperable
multiple-regulation problem that demands Commerce Clause attention.
As a California court noted in applying the California statute to a Utah
corporation, given the significant presence in California that was necessary to trigger the statute, it is unlikely more than one such state law
would apply to a given corporation.255 So while the Commerce Clause
might bar some corporate statutes that force firms to comply with multiple states’ laws, this does not elevate the IAD to special constitutional
status.
The strongest argument for the constitutional status of the IAD is
based on the Court’s use of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward.256 There the Court held that the Contract Clause257 invalidated a
New Hampshire statute that altered the terms of a British crown charter
248. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
249. Id. at 640–43.
250. 481 U.S. 69 (1980).
251. Id. at 91–94.
252. See Vantagepoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1116 (Del. 2005);
McDermott, Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 218–19 (Del. 1987); Timothy P. Glynn, Delaware’s Vantagepoint: The Empire Strikes Back in the Post-Post-Enron Era 4–5 (Seton Hall Pub. Law & Legal Research Series, Working Paper No. 2007-001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=966449 (criticizing
Delaware’s assertion of the constitutional basis of the IAD).
253. See Wilson v. La.-Pac. Res., Inc., 187 Cal. Rptr. 852 (Ct. App. 1982).
254. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 1990).
255. Wilson, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 859–60.
256. 17 U.S. 518 (1819).
257. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (providing that “[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing
the Obligation of Contract”).
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granted to Dartmouth College because the charter was a contract. CTS
cited Dartmouth College in reasoning that “no principle of corporation
law and practice is more firmly established than a State’s authority to
regulate domestic corporations, including the authority to define the voting rights of shareholders.”258 However, while this reasoning permits a
state to regulate the internal affairs of its own corporations, it still does
not necessarily follow that only the incorporating state can do so.
The IAD might have quasi-constitutional status as a limit on the
reach of federal law through the Supremacy Clause. As discussed above,
CTS emphasized the incorporating state’s special province over corporate governance. Conversely, when the Court held that state securities
actions were preempted by the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards
Act, it reasoned that “[t]he magnitude of the federal interest in protecting the integrity and efficient operation of the market for nationally
traded securities cannot be overstated.”259 But the Court seems to be distinguishing between “securities” and “internal governance” issues rather
than endorsing the IAD. Many federal “securities” laws reach deep into
the kind of internal governance issues covered by the IAD, including the
Williams Act, which regulates takeovers, the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, which imposes the first internal controls reporting in the wake of the
corporate bribery scandals of the 1970’s, and, of course, the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002.260
Thus, while the Commerce Clause suggests that the Court might
impose some order on the states, such order does not necessarily have to
be achieved with the IAD. At most, the IAD helps mark out an area
that is relatively safe from federal preemption. But this is only a suggestion rather than a constitutional boundary, as shown by the continuing
forward march of federal corporation law.
The important question for present purposes is whether the Court
should follow the implication of cases like CTS and use the Commerce
Clause (or perhaps Full Faith and Credit/Due Process) to forbid a state
from imposing its corporate law on a foreign corporation. This result
cannot be based on the notion that multiple state laws would excessively
burden interstate firms because although it is necessary for only one state
law to apply, that state need not be the incorporating state. Even if the
incorporating state has the best claim to applying its law, this claim does
not necessarily deserve constitutional protection.

258. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987).
259. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 78 (2006); see Ribstein,
Dabit, Preemption, and Choice of Law, supra note 130, at 160–65 (analyzing the case and its preemption issue).
260. For discussions of the increasing federalization of state corporate law, see Robert B. Ahdieh,
From “Federalization” to “Mixed Governance” in Corporate Law: A Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley, 53
BUFF. L. REV. 721 (2005); Renee M. Jones, Does Federalism Matter? Its Perplexing Role in the Corporate Governance Debate, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 879 (2006); Mark J. Loewenstein, The Supreme
Court, Rule 10b-5 and the Federalization of Corporate Law, 39 IND. L. REV. 17 (2006).
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The law market perspective contributes to this analysis. First, it
shows that Commerce Clause protection may not be necessary because
of the role of party mobility and exit-affected interest groups discussed in
this article. Because this mobility was enough to enable the IAD to develop without any direct constitutional support, it is not clear why the
constitution would be necessary to bolster it now.
Second, this article shows that the IAD has no stronger policy basis
than other rules for enforcing choice-of-law clauses. Thus, if the IAD
has constitutional status, so should rules enforcing choice-of-law clauses
in other types of contracts. For example, if the IAD has constitutional
status, why not insist on the enforcement of clauses designating the applicable law in franchise, insurance, consumer, or employment agreements—all agreements where courts are inclined to invoke the “fundamental policy” exceptions under general choice-of-law rules?261 While
there are distinctions between these contracts and those dealing with
corporate governance, the question is whether these distinctions rise to a
constitutional dimension. Given the close connections between the corporate and general law markets discussed in this paper, there is no obvious way the Court could carve out a distinctly “corporate” area for constitutional protection. It would then have to immerse itself in state
choice-of-law jurisprudence, a move it took up but quickly abandoned at
the beginning of the 20th century.
B.

The Corporation as Contract

The law market has broad implications for how the government
should approach regulating corporate governance. Since the inception of
the modern publicly held corporation, there has been a lively debate between those who view the corporation as a political entity, consistent
with its origins as a state-created franchise, and those who view it as the
product of private contract.262 An important basis for the state-creation
position is that corporations are the beneficiaries of a choice-of-law rule
that allows them to choose any state’s law for their corporate governance. This state-created privilege seems to justify exacting the price of
greater susceptibility to regulation than other contractual relationships.
We have seen, however, that the IAD does not give Delaware
courts power over corporations’ worldwide activities. Rather, this article
shows that the IAD is a relatively narrow doctrine that leaves plenty of
room for regulation by the states in which corporations carry on their activities. It follows that the IAD not only does not need to be justified by
a political theory, but also does not itself confer a special privilege that
should make the corporation, in effect, a ward of the state.

261.
262.

See supra text accompanying note 116.
See supra note 14.
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The relationship between the corporate law market and contractual
choice of law generally is also significant in deciding how the IAD should
be applied. Consider, for example, Rosenmiller v. Bordes,263 where the
court applied Delaware law to a Delaware corporation despite a New
Jersey choice-of-law clause in the firm’s shareholder agreement. Because the IAD is only a rule for enforcing contractual choice of law, it
arguably should be interpreted like any other choice-of-law clause—that
is, consistent with the contracting parties’ expectations. Incorporating in
Delaware arguably indicates the parties’ intent to apply Delaware law to
all corporate-governance-related matters notwithstanding a contrary
choice-of-law clause in the shareholder agreement. Or one might argue
to the contrary that the later agreement trumps the earlier Delaware incorporation.
Even if the corporation is simply a contract, the state has the power
to regulate it, just as it does other contracts. From this standpoint, the
law market analysis provides a rationale for regulating corporate choice
of law. Thus, the Rosenmiller result might be explained in terms of the
law market processes discussed in this article. The Delaware court might
have been attempting to avoid creating a precedent that would enable
other states to undermine Delaware’s investment in corporate law.
Delaware needs supply side incentives in order to produce high quality
law. Delaware arguably can protect its significant investment in its corporate law “infrastructure” only if it can restrict the privilege of using
Delaware law in Delaware courts to Delaware corporations, which have
paid the full incorporation fee. This suggests that Delaware would hesitate to let parties circumvent the fee by incorporating elsewhere and
agreeing to apply Delaware law.264 In so regulating contractual choice of
law, Delaware would be protecting Delaware policy—in this case, its policy protecting Delaware’s investment in its corporate infrastructure. This
is not fundamentally different from any state’s refusing to enforce a
choice-of-law clause in order to prevent evasion of local policy.
C.

State or Federal Law?

As discussed in subpart A, the Court has cited states’ power over internal corporate governance as a basis for refusing to preempt state-ofincorporation takeover regulation. Under the traditional analysis, states
have special rights over internal governance, while the federal government regulates the securities markets. But this is an artificial distinction.
As a matter of policy it is far from clear why the federal government

263.
264.

607 A.2d 465, 468–69 (Del. Ch. 1991).
See Ribstein, supra note 76, at 1022–25.
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should not regulate internal corporate governance, which obviously affects the national securities markets.265
The law market lens provides a clearer view of this policy issue.
The application of federal law to corporate or other contracts should depend at least in part on whether the IAD or other rule on contractual
choice of law is a viable alternative. As long as a state regulates only
firms that choose its law, state law probably does not impose the sort of
burdens that require federal relief. Just as the Court need not protect
the IAD under the “negative” version of the Commerce Clause, so Congress need not act under its positive Commerce Clause power. By contrast, when a nonincorporating state seeks to regulate corporate governance, there is a risk of multiple state regulations that may justify federal
preemption. Note that this argument applies to any matter covered by
incorporating state law, and not just those matters traditionally covered
by the IAD. It follows that a state should be concerned about triggering
federal preemption only when it trumps the IAD or other contractual
choice of law, and not when it seeks to expand the matters covered by
the IAD or other choice-of-law contracts.
Federal law theoretically could solve the problem of state nonapplication of the IAD not by displacing these laws, but alternatively by providing for federal enforcement of contractual choice. A possible mechanism for federal intervention into enforcing contractual choice of law
could be through a law preempting state laws on corporate governance
or securities except to the extent that it is subject to the IAD. Congress
used a similar approach in the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards
Act, which prohibited state law actions for securities fraud.266 The Act
exempted from preemption certain state disclosure actions that are currently governed by state corporate law.267 Congress might have adopted
the approach suggested here simply by extending the “carve-out” to any
action that is governed by the IAD.268
The analysis so far in this section focuses on the risk of state overregulation by disregarding contractual choice. Federal intervention
theoretically also may be warranted if there is evidence of underregulation, or a race-to-the-bottom, from state court enforcement of the IAD.
This depends, among other things, on whether states are vigorously competing to provide corporate law, or whether, instead, Delaware dominates the market. In fact, Delaware’s dominance is far from clear, given

265. See Ahdieh, supra note 260, at 741–45; Donald C. Langevoort, Federalism in Corporate/Securities Law: Reflections on Delaware, California, and State Regulation of Insider Trading, 40
U.S.F. L. REV. 879, 890–91 (2006).
266. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b) (2000); id. § 78bb(f)(1).
267. Id. § 77p(d)(1); id. § 78bb(f)(3)(a).
268. See Ribstein, Dabit, Preemption, and Choice of Law, supra note 130, at 165–71 (suggesting
this approach).
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substantial evidence that home jurisdictions compete to keep local firms
from incorporating in Delaware.269
Although we cannot here settle the race-to-the-bottom debate, we
can at least suggest that there is a policy basis for distinguishing between
federal preemption when the state courts do not respect contractual
choice of law and preemption when state courts do respect contractual
choice. In the former case, federal intervention often may be necessary
to protect against significant interstate spillovers. In this situation state
competition has broken down to the extent that single states are able to
regulate national firms. That will be the case whenever national firms in
interstate commerce cannot cheaply avoid state contacts that enable
states to regulate.
On the other hand, when the states respect choice-of-law contracts
or the IAD, a market for law theoretically can operate in which the states
have incentives to meet the needs of all contracting parties. To be sure,
contractual choice is not always desirable: these contracts may be impaired by bargaining defects or may impose costs on non-contracting parties. But the states have an opportunity to impose super-mandatory rules
within the constraints of law market processes, including the “shadow” of
potential federal preemption discussed above.270 Given these checks, the
race-to-the-bottom seems to be a lower priority risk than the risk of potential spillovers when states go outside the bounds of contractual choice.
This analysis suggests that the federal government should follow a policy
of presuming against preemption whenever there is a functioning law
market in the sense that the states generally enforce contractual choice of
law. That would certainly be the case for corporate law given the IAD.
The analysis in this subpart suggests that while states might be concerned that underregulation would trigger a federal response, they need
not have this concern from regulating unless in doing so they also refuse
to enforce contractual choice of law. Some recent cases in which Delaware courts have hesitated in expanding the scope of Delaware corporate
law into the federal preserve of securities regulation indicate that Delaware has misperceived the nature of the federal preemption threat. The
Delaware Supreme Court initially held in Malone v. Brincat271 that
shareholders could sue directors for breach of fiduciary duty based on
false financial statements in SEC reports and shareholder communications, even if the statements are not connected with corporate transactions. Delaware Chief Justice Steele was dubious about this theory when
he decided Malone as Vice Chancellor, noting that
Congress has articulated a standard of disclosure to protect the national securities market. It makes little sense for Delaware courts to
impose either a duplicative or stricter standard on directors of
269.
270.
271.

See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part III.C.
722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998).
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Delaware corporations. Neither the Delaware corporation code
nor the common law suggests that Delaware can or should pick up
the perceived regulatory slack when federal scrutiny may not include review of every actionable theory divinable by a dogged
plaintiff.272
Vice Chancellor Leo Strine expressed a similar concern in holding
against a Delaware remedy for insider trading. Referring to the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act,273 he said that state regulation of
insider trading “might . . . fuel further legislative developments, as what
was understood by Congress to be a narrow and fixed ‘Delaware carveout’ for traditional fiduciary duty claims turns out to be an expanding excavation site that unsettles the structure of federal securities law.”274 In
other words, a Delaware remedy for insider trading might invite more
federal preemption of state law. Professor Langevoort correctly sees
Strine’s restraint as an attempt to maintain separate spheres for federal
and state law.275
The concern expressed in these cases is not warranted under this article’s analysis. Congress has little reason to occupy a state law area just
because Delaware has sought to provide greater protection in an area
covered by federal law. The appropriate scope of federal regulation
should depend for corporate law, as for the law market generally, on the
costs of leaving this matter to the states. If the states can coordinate with
each other by enforcing contractual choice of law, there may be little role
for federal regulation. Indeed, Delaware ought to have precisely the opposite concern: that doing nothing might trigger a federal response regardless of whether such a response is appropriate.276
D.

Which State? The Limits of the IAD

When should, and will, a state apply another state’s corporation law
to locally based firms? To see these issues, consider some recent California cases. One case indicated that California clearly feels bound by
272. Malone v. Brincat, No. 15510, 1997 WL 697940, at 2 (Del. Ch. Oct. 30, 1997), rev’d, 722 A.2d
5 (Del. 1998).
273. See supra text accompanying note 266.
274. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., No. Civ. A. 18751, 2004 WL 2756278, at *24 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 2, 2004) (footnotes omitted).
275. See Langevoort, supra note 265.
276. One might argue that the federal government would be more likely to act in the face of state
over-enforcement of contractual choice of law that resulted in neglecting interests that otherwise
would be protected by state mandatory rules. For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act might be seen as
a reaction to the inadequacies of state corporation law under the IAD. However, it is more accurate
to view a law like SOX as a reaction to what Congress views as a mistake or inadequacy of substantive
state law than as a reaction to a particular choice-of-law rule. In other words, mistaken state policy
rather than excessive state coordination is the basis for federal action. Thus, if the IAD were less universally recognized—if, for example, California defected and imposed its own version of SOX—
Congress would more likely see this as a justification for acting than as undercutting the need to act.
To the extent that a choice-of-law rule is a basis for Congressional action, the rejection of the IAD is
more likely to call for federal action than its acceptance.
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the IAD. In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Superior
Court,277 the court applied Illinois corporate law to determine the duty of
directors of an Illinois mutual insurance company to pay dividends, relying on the IAD rather than the usual contract analysis under Second Restatement § 187.
The California courts are, however, less sure about the scope of the
rule. Thus, a California appellate court held in Friese v. Superior Court278
that a shareholders’ derivative action brought on the corporation’s behalf
under the California securities law for insider trading was not barred by
the fact that the incorporating state (Delaware) did not allow such a
claim. Meanwhile, a federal court held in In re Sagent Technology, Inc.
Derivative Litigation279 that the IAD did apply to this type of claim. And
yet another California appellate court held in Grosset v. Wenaas280 that
the incorporating state’s law trumped California’s requirement that derivative plaintiffs hold their shares throughout the litigation, although
recognizing the California requirement that plaintiff own shares at the
time of the transaction would have applied. Grosset is now being reviewed by the California Supreme Court.
The issue in these cases arguably does not concern the appropriate
sphere of state internal governance regulation, but only what issues the
incorporating state has actually sought to regulate. Because the IAD is
simply a contractual choice-of-law rule, a court need not decide whether
the suit involves “securities trading” or “internal governance” in some
fundamental sense. Thus, if Delaware decides that shareholders should
be able to sue their firms derivatively to recover an insider’s trading profits, this constitutes a contract among the shareholders to apply Delaware
law to these suits wherever they are brought and wherever the shareholders and insiders reside. This would also be the case if Delaware
clearly has determined to provide a breach of fiduciary action for insider
trading.
California could, of course, decide to regulate Delaware corporations, including aspects that relate to internal governance, and thereby
protect California residents. As discussed in subpart A, the constitution
would not preclude this regulation. States arguably should be able to invalidate choice-of-law contracts pursuant to a statute that clearly expresses their intent to do so.281 Because the IAD is a contractual choiceof-law rule, the same approach should apply to the IAD.

277. 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 56 (Ct. App. 2003).
278. 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 558 (Ct. App. 2005), cert. denied, Moores v. Friese, 127 S. Ct. 138 (Oct 02,
2006).
279. 278 F. Supp. 2d 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
280. 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 58 (Ct. App. 2005), review granted and opinion superseded by Grosset v.
Wennas, 127 P.3d 27 (Cal. 2006).
281. See O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 31, at 1199–1200 (proposing this rule for choice-of-law
clauses).
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The question, then, is when it would be appropriate for California
to regulate a Delaware corporation.282 California might reasonably decide that whether it trumps Delaware law depends on whether the matter
relates to a central aspect of Delaware policy and expertise—that is, internal corporate governance rather than securities regulation. On the
other hand, California could decide that it wishes to impose its law
whenever the potential harm to California residents is enough to justify
California regulation. The focus on internal governance impedes analysis by forcing courts into awkward modes to rationalize their result.
Rather than making an artificial distinction between internal governance
and other issues, the California legislature should face the tough question
of whether it wants to impose the regulation and act accordingly.
If several states regulating Delaware corporate insiders impose undue burdens on multistate firms, Congress may have to step in, just as it
did when California’s nonderivative securities law liability provoked passage of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act.283 Indeed, the
securities laws generally could be viewed as a reaction to burdensome
state securities regulation. Although Congress did not preempt state law
in 1933 or 1934, it did so in 1997 when California threatened to undercut
Congress’s attempt to limit securities class actions.284 But whether Congress should act depends on whether the states can coordinate without
federal help by construing the scope of the IAD. This article’s analysis
suggests that the law market can constrain aggressive state action in
many cases without aggressive federal intervention.
E.

Implications for Future Scholarship

This article has important implications for studying jurisdictional
competition. Instead of focusing on a specific subset of contracts relating
to the governance of publicly held corporations, the appropriate perspective is the general market for law. Indeed, there are different submarkets
for a continuum of different types of contracts, including business-

282. There is a separate question as to whether and under what circumstances a state other than
Delaware may adjudicate governance issues under Delaware law. Delaware judges have refused to
stay or dismiss actions in Delaware in the face of related suits involving the same firm filed in other
jurisdictions. See In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 2007 No. Civ. A. 2786-UCS, WL 1412990 (Del. Ch.
May 9, 2007); Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341 (Del. Ch. 2007). Both courts rely heavily on Delaware
courts’ interest and expertise in maintaining the quality of Delaware law, particularly in cases involving novel questions of law. Clearly this would be a strong consideration supporting enforcement in
Delaware or New York of a provision designating a Delaware forum either in the corporate charter or
as a statutory default rule. But it is not clear what the Delaware courts should do in the unlikely event
that the parties entered into a choice-of-forum clause explicitly choosing a New York court. Perhaps
Delaware should be able to protect its investment in its law by refusing to enforce the clause. On the
other hand, enforcement of this contract would enable the law market to exert discipline on Delaware
courts.
283. See supra text accompanying note 259.
284. See Joshua D. Ratner, Stockholders’ Holding Claim Class Actions Under State Law After the
Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1035, 1042–51 (2001).
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association-type contracts. Future work should continue exploring these
differences and similarities. This article has suggested some issues that
are ripe for analysis. For example, why is there a single dominant player
in the market for public corporations, but an oligopoly in the market for
noncorporate commercial contracts? What explains Florida’s evident
success in the market for closely held firms? Why have non-Delaware
states, particularly Maryland, succeeded in dominating the market for
some publicly held unincorporated firms? What explains when a particular state will compete in the law market, and the nature of the competition it engages in? What types of laws are susceptible to being “traded”
in the market for law?
These issues are important to understanding the role of state law in
an increasingly globalizing world. When even the smallest e-commerce
firms have broad international networks of suppliers and customers, state
law seems to be increasingly an anachronism. Yet giving law-making
functions to a single lawmaker eliminates exit as a constraint on suboptimal laws, and reduces experimentation and diversity at a time when
these features are increasingly necessary. The corporate law market, in
which party choice is generally enforced subject to reserving the power
to states and countries to enact explicitly super-mandatory rules, points
the way toward accommodating local law with a global economy.
F.

Summary

This Part has examined some implications of the law market perspective. First, the scope of constitutional protection for the IAD depends directly on the relationship between the IAD and the general law
market: the closer this relationship, the weaker the argument for giving
special protection to corporate choice of law. Moreover, the competitive
forces underlying the law market, which among other things were responsible for the birth of the IAD even in the absence of constitutional
protection, indicate that constitutional protection may not be necessary.
Second, the close relationship between the corporate law market
and the general market for law supports the characterization of the corporation as a contract. The IAD is not a special privilege accorded corporations because of their origin as state-conferred concessions. It is
rather an application of the same forces that underlie other aspects of the
law market.
Third, the law market analysis bears on the dividing line between
state and federal law. Clearly there is no sharp distinction between “corporate” and “securities” law. But this does not tell us where the divide
should be, and even less that federal law should encroach even further on
the state domain. The law market analysis instructs that federal law is
necessary, and indeed has been used, mainly as a fallback when the states
have failed to enforce contractual choice of law. Thus, the division between state and federal law does not depend on whether Delaware seeks
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to regulate securities, but on whether California is willing to respect that
regulation.
This analysis obviously carries over to the question of the extent to
which states should be able to regulate firms whose governance is subject
to the law of another state. Again, the answer does not depend on a
sharp divide between “corporate” and other law, for the simple reason
that there is no unique market for corporate law. As in other aspects of
the law market, Delaware makes its own decision about the extent to
which it seeks to regulate corporations, while California makes its decision about the extent to which it will respect Delaware law. The IAD as
currently configured is important only because it has been generally successful as a coordinating mechanism. In other words, the states have
been willing to respect other states’ laws as long as they stay within the
relatively innocuous confines of the IAD rather than intruding on policy
concerns the states care more about. But this does not mean that there is
a hard and fast policy distinction between the issues that are within, and
those that are outside, the IAD.
Finally, the law market analysis has important implications for future scholarship. This article has indicated several issues on which more
research is appropriate concerning the nature of the law market. There
are many other potential illustrations of the advantages of escaping the
intellectual rut of the supposedly unique market for corporate law.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The IAD and the market for corporate law have been studied as
unique phenomena. In fact, these topics need to be understood within
the context of the general market for law. There are important connections between choice of law for corporations and contractual choice of
law in other settings. These include not only the commercial contracts
examined for comparison in this article, but also domestic relations,285
property,286 securities regulation,287 bankruptcy,288 and electronic commerce.289 As with the IAD, understanding the general policies and politics underlying the law market can produce useful insights into jurisdictional competition, with important implications for such topics as
constitutional law and the nature of the corporation.

285. See F.H. Buckley & Larry E. Ribstein, Calling a Truce in the Marriage Wars, 2001 U. ILL. L.
REV. 561.
286. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchmovsky, Of Property and Federalism, 115 YALE L.J. 72
(2005).
287. See Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 130.
288. See Robert R. Rasmussen, Resolving Transnational Insolvencies Through Private Ordering,
98 MICH. L. REV. 2252 (2000).
289. See Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, State Regulation of Electronic Commerce, 51
EMORY L.J. 1 (2002).
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